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Abstract 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
This paper is the first to estimate the effect of two international agreements (Rotterdam Convention, RC, 
and the Stockholm Convention, SC) in reducing trade in hazardous substances. We estimate the effects of 
ratification of these agreements on imports of the affected products putting emphasis in the flows from 
developed countries (OECD) to developing countries (non-OECD) to capture pollution deviation. We use 
product level data to identify the goods subject to the conventions and the identification strategy relies on 
the use of difference-in-difference techniques in a panel data framework. We find that when the exporter 
ratifies the RC and the flow is from OECD to non-OECD countries, a significant reduction of imports in hazardous 
chemicals is observed after ratification. The magnitude of the effect is a cumulative decrease in imports of about 7 
percent. In the case of the SC, the results show significant reductions in trade shipments from OECD to non-OECD 
countries in persistent organic pollutants for non-OECD importers that have ratified the convention. We observe a 
reduction of around 16 percent, more than double the effect found for the RC, which was expected due to the 
different obligations imposed by the respective conventions. 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Keywords:    Hazardous chemicals, persistent organic pollutants, environmental agreements, international trade, 
gravity model. 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Are International Environmental Policies Effective? The Case of the 
Rotterdam and the Stockholm Conventions 
1. Introduction 
Developing countries have an incentive to sign International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) to prevent 
themselves from becoming pollution or waste havens. However, they may fail to effectively enforce the obligations 
resulting from ratified IEAs. Consequently, unscrupulous individuals and firms could take advantage of these lax or 
non-existent regulations to send dangerous products to developing countries. To prevent this from happening, IEAs 
could act as a vehicle through which both importing and exporting countries can establish better institutional 
frameworks. Among the existing IEAs, the Rotterdam Convention (RC) and the Stockholm Convention (SC) focus 
specifically on regulating the production, use, export and import of hazardous chemicals (HCs) and persistent 
organic pollutants (POPs), which are among the abovementioned dangerous products and which have undesirable 
effects on human health.  
The RC has two key provisions. The first is a legally binding Prior Informed Consent (PIC) procedure, according to 
which the exporting country must obtain consent from the importing country in order to send HCs. For example, for 
Aldrin —one of the products targeted by the RC— there have been 120 such requests since 1993 (only 40 after 
2004), of which 113 have resulted in a “no consent to import” response, only 4 have received “consent to import” 
(the importers were Congo, Nepal, Tanzania and Zimbabwe), and the remaining 3 obtained “consent to import 
subject to specific conditions” (Korea, Singapore and Zambia). Interestingly, all requests since 2004 have been 
denied. The second key provision is the Information Exchange, which consists in facilitating the exchange of 
information among parties concerning potentially hazardous chemicals. This provision stipulates that the secretariat 
of the convention must be notified of any change in national regulations that results in the banning of or restrictions 
on a chemical. 
The SC is a multilateral treaty aimed at protecting human health by requiring parties to take measures to eliminate or 
reduce the release—whether intentional or unintentional—of POPs into the environment. Intentionally released POPs 
are listed in Annexes A and B, and unintentionally released POPs in Annex C. Each party is required to eliminate the 
production, export, import and use of POPs listed in Annex A, and to restrict the production and use of those listed in 
Annexes B and C. The key challenge identified by the convention secretariats is the inadequate implementation of 
national-level obligations concerning adoption and compliance mechanisms.  
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To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to consistently evaluate the effects of the RC and SC on trade 
using difference-in-difference techniques in a panel data framework. We hypothesize that the ratification of these 
conventions should have had a direct effect on trade in HCs in the case of the RC and POPs in the case of the SC. 
Both conventions deal with substances that when released into the environment could be very harmful to human 
health, and are therefore undesirable unless appropriately used or treated to reduce or eliminate the damage they may 
cause. In particular, HCs (as classified by the American Occupational Safety and Health Administration) are both 
toxic and reactive and have great potential to cause harmful health effects when they are released. Relatively low-
level exposure to these substances is linked to cancer, birth defects, genetic damage, miscarriages and even death. 
Regarding the products covered by the second convention, POPs, it has been shown that these products also have 
non-negligible negative effects on human health and the environment. Some of the identified health effects are 
cardiovascular disease, cancer, obesity, and diabetes. POPs are also considered hormone disruptors, which can alter 
the normal functioning of the endocrine and reproductive systems in humans and wildlife. 
To investigate whether the entry into force of the conventions has altered trade flows in the products in question, we 
estimate a gravity model of trade using highly disaggregated trade data (6-digit Harmonized System (HS) 
classification) on HCs and POPs in 88 countries over the period 1995-2012. More specifically, we seek to establish 
whether there has been a reduction in shipments from OECD to non-OECD countries when the trading partners have 
ratified any of the two conventions. The identification strategy relies on estimating the difference in import levels 
before and after the ratification of each convention by controlling for unobserved heterogeneity that is country-pair-
product specific and time invariant and also for multilateral resistance factors that are country specific and time 
variant. This strategy is borrowed from the international trade literature that seeks to identify the effect of regional 
trade agreements on bilateral trade (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007). The strategy has been applied to disaggregated 
trade data, which allow us to exploit variation in imports over time at the country-pair-product level.  
To the best of our knowledge, Kellenberg and Levinson (2014) is the only study evaluating the effects of the most 
recent agreements on trade in waste. They investigate whether the Basel Convention and Ban have resulted in less 
waste being traded among ratifying countries. The paper finds that the Basel Convention and Ban seem to have no 
effect at all on the growth of international hazardous waste and almost no effect on shipments from developed to 
developing countries. As a consequence, the authors suggest linking IEAs to trade sanctions to strengthen their 
effectiveness. Our main departure from Kellenberg and Levinson (2014) is that whereas they aggregate all waste 
categories and estimate the model for total waste exports, we use the product-level data in our estimations and focus 
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on two more recent conventions. Moreover, we present estimation results at different aggregation levels to infer 
whether there could be an aggregation bias. 
The main results indicate that when the exporter ratifies the RC, lower amounts of HCs are shipped from OECD 
countries to non-OECD countries. In the case of the SC, smaller amounts of POPs are shipped from ratifying OECD 
countries to non-OECD countries, when the importer ratifies the treaty. These results are substantially different to 
those of Kellenberg and Levinson (2014), who do not find any effect of the Basel Convention and the corresponding 
Ban. Our results point instead to the effectiveness of both conventions in reducing trade in the targeted substances. 
Moreover, when the gravity model is estimated using data at different aggregation levels, we find that the estimated 
effects are substantially different when descending at the product level. 
Although, in accordance with the corresponding theoretical models, most of the early research evaluating the effects 
of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) found that they were generally ineffective (Barrett, 1994, 1997; 
Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993), recent theoretical developments show more mixed results (Carraro, 2014). Hence, we 
claim that the question of the effectiveness of the agreements is very relevant and is ultimately an empirical question. 
This paper main methodological innovation is the use of highly disaggregated data that serves as a basis for the used 
identification strategy. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the related theories and main hypotheses, 
summarizes the closely related empirical literature and describes the conventions.  Section 3 describes the data and 
variables and outlines the empirical strategy and model specification. Next, Section 4 presents the main results and 
Section 5 details the results of several robustness checks.  Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Environmental treaties on waste, hazardous chemicals and persistent organic 
pollutants:  theory and evidence 
2.1. Theory and main hypotheses 
A number of authors have investigated the effectiveness of MEAs in reducing pollution or improving environmental 
quality. The early theoretical models conclude that most MEAs tend to be ineffective due to the so called free-rider 
problem.3  Indeed, the findings tend to show that global agreements can only work if the abatement targets are far 
below the optimum level (Barrett, 1994; Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993). The free-rider problem could be overcome 
                                                          
3
 In this context a free-rider problem occurs when some countries can benefit from lower global emissions without investing in 
clean technologies or implementing environmental regulations, because other countries do it for them.  
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by establishing a central authority with coercive power, but in the case of international environmental issues, this 
solution seems unlikely. Nevertheless, more recent literature (summarized in Carraro, 2014) suggests that these 
predictions might be too pessimistic. For instance, if countries involved in the agreements are risk averse and the 
environmental damage attached to non-compliance is uncertain, countries may be willing to comply and to 
cooperate. This could be the case with hazardous waste, since most countries are aware of the detrimental effects on 
the environment and on human health. In these cases, it could be enough to have the right institutions to encourage 
cooperation and compliance (Carraro and Siniscalco, 1998; and Ecchia and Mariotti, 1998). Some countries may 
show more interest than others in controlling or stopping these activities and non-state actors may also play an 
important role. As such, the ratification of agreements could be influenced by different incentives. Indeed, as early as 
1994, developing countries (G-77) and environmental NGOs called for a decision to ban the trade of waste, which 
then materialized in the Basel Ban Amendment. 4 
The effectiveness of the MEAs also depends on the existence of optimal environmental policies at the country level. 
According to Rauscher (1997), international trade in hazardous waste might be biased towards the importing country 
if environmental externalities are not internalized. In such cases, the countries that produce waste or dangerous 
products may have incentives to export these products to countries with lower environmental standards (Fikru, 
2012). Moreover, the importation of ‘bad’ products by developing countries could also be explained by the 
prevalence of low-cost disposal and organized crime (Clapp, 1997); the latter is negatively correlated with the 
stringency of environmental regulations (Kellenberg, 2013). 
Differences in environmental regulations between countries could also be a source of comparative advantage and 
hence trade. In this regard, the pollution haven hypothesis (PHH) states that countries with more stringent 
environmental regulations will specialize in clean industries, whereas countries with lax environmental regulations 
tend to specialize in and export dirty products. The PHH applied to waste (the waste haven effect, as termed by 
Kellenberg (2012)) implies that greater differences in environmental standards between countries will foster trade in 
waste from countries with stringent environmental laws to countries with lax environmental laws. The PHH applied 
to dangerous substances such as HCs or POPs would imply that countries which have ratified one of the two 
conventions and are thus subject to more stringent regulations, will reduce exports of the substances affected by the 
given convention at least to ratifying countries, whereas exports to non-ratifying countries might increase in 
comparison with trade among ratifying countries. 
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 At the Second Conference of Parties held in Geneva. 
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The fact that institutions often fail to create the necessary environmental regulations in developing countries, means 
that additional mechanisms must be implemented to control and deter trade in dangerous goods. One way of 
overcoming the inadequate institutions or lack of regulatory framework in developing countries could be based on a 
developed-country policy approach. Yokoo and Kinnaman (2013) find that a tax on the consumption of new durable 
goods in developed countries combined with a waste tax set below the domestic external cost of disposal, could be 
sufficient to achieve global efficiency. To that end, MEAs could be used as additional policy instruments to prevent 
the imports of dangerous substances by developing countries. 
Applying these insights to dangerous products, we expect more stringent regulations concerning the production and 
use of hazardous products to generate an incentive to send those dangerous substances to countries with lax 
environmental regulations. In the case of the two conventions examined in this paper, the RC and the SC, we 
hypothesize that the ratification of these conventions should have had a negative direct effect on trade in the products 
covered by the conventions: HCs in the RC and POPs in the SC. More specifically, we expect the amount of 
dangerous substances sent from OECD countries to non-OECD countries to decrease after the exporters and/or 
importers ratify a convention, as proposed by the PHH. Hence, the effect will occur in North-South rather than 
North-North trade, given that the environmental standards and disposal facilities tend to be similar in developed 
countries and the conventions mainly affect trade between countries with very different environmental regulations 
(Kellenberg, 2015). 
2.2. Empirical evidence 
This subsection summarizes the main results found in the related literature on the empirical evaluation of the 
influence of MEAs. We begin with general findings and then narrow the focus to papers that evaluate the 
effectiveness of treaties and conventions on hazardous products and waste. 
A fairly comprehensive general overview of environmental agreements effects can be found in Mitchell (2003, 
2006). He finds that only a subset of the numerous existing agreements, more than 1000 MEAs in 2013, has been 
empirically evaluated. There are several reasons for the lack of scientific research in this area.  First, there has been 
scarce available data on the relevant environmental quality indicators until recent years and it is somewhat difficult 
to identify the expected effects of specific agreements. Second, some agreements target multiple environmental 
problems and it is not obvious which environmental indicator should be the focus of the evaluation. Finally, the 
endogeneity of participation in the agreement hinders the precise identification of the effect. 
7 
 
Mitchell (2003) points to somewhat mixed results regarding the identifiable effectiveness of MEAs. Some studies 
show clear evidence of a positive effect on the targeted environmental-quality indicator; for example, Parson (2003), 
Wettestad (2001) and Greene (1998) evaluate ozone agreements and find a reduction in the consumption of 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) in industrialized countries, perhaps also due to the existence of close substitutes for 
these products or to the declining manufacturing sector in these countries. 
In other cases, the evaluations show no effect. International whaling agreements, for example, were widely believed 
to have contributed to the current stable stock levels until Schneider and Pearce (2004) showed that market forces —
and not the ratification of these agreements— were behind the declining catch. Skjaerseth (2001) and Haas (1990) 
show the Mediterranean Pollution Plan to have had little effect on marine pollution. Finally, some conflicting 
outcomes are put forward in Munton et al. (1999), who emphasize that the results of many studies are highly 
susceptible to the chosen methodology. 
Another major international agreement is the Kyoto Protocol, for which a few authors have found mixed evidence of 
its effectiveness. Aichele and Felbermayr (2012) analyse the impact of ratifying the Kyoto Protocol on countries’ 
CO2 emissions between 1997 and 2007. In order to overcome the problem of self-selection into the protocol, the 
authors use a country’s membership in the International Criminal Court (ICC) to instrument the Kyoto variable, its 
spatial lag and restrict the data to a sample of 40 countries. Their findings indicate that countries with Kyoto 
commitments emit on average about 8 percent less CO2 than countries without. Using an alternative identification 
strategy to address the self-selection issue, namely a matching difference-in-difference estimator, Grunewald and 
Martinez-Zarzoso (2015) consistently find a 7-10 percent reduction in CO2 emissions attributable to the adoption of 
the Kyoto Protocol. Mazzanti and Musolesi (2009) also find the Kyoto Protocol has a negative effect on CO2 
emissions for the northern EU country group. This is in contrast to the Almer and Winkler (2017) study, in which 
they test for the existence of a reduction in emissions in 15 Annex B countries with binding emission targets and find 
that CO2 emissions are not below what they would have been without the protocol. They claim that the opposing 
trends in CO2 emissions between countries with and without binding emission targets lead to a violation of the 
common trend assumption made in previous studies and that failure to address this could invalidate the results. 
However, Grunewald and Martinez-Zarzoso (2015) could not reject the parallel trend assumption when restricting 
the sample to high-income countries (see Figure 2, page 11). The possible divergence in the results may instead be 
due to the way in which the counterfactual sample is constructed in Almer and Winkler (2017). 
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Given the diversity of the agreements in terms of content, scope and targeted environmental outcomes, we now focus 
on papers that evaluate the effectiveness of agreements involving the trade of waste, HCs and POPs. 
Trade in waste and dangerous substances is a relatively new area of research. Baggs (2009) was one of the first 
authors to study this topic. He analyses the determinants of trade in hazardous waste using a gravity model with 
country characteristics for the period from 1994 to 1997. He interprets the negative coefficient of per capita income 
(only significant at the 10 percent level) for the importer countries as an indication of the existence of a waste haven 
effect. Behind this interpretation is the idea that GDP per capita could be a proxy for the stringency of environmental 
regulations. Hence, assuming that citizens demand higher environmental quality when they become richer, lower 
amounts of waste should be exported to countries with higher GDP per capita. Since there were no multilateral 
agreements limiting trade in waste in the study period, the author cannot analyse their effects on bilateral trade. 
Additionally, no environmental regulation differences are explicitly included in the analysis, and proxying those with 
GDP per capita might be problematic, given that differences in income per capita may also reflect wage differences 
across countries. 
Assuming that differences in environmental regulation matter, Kellenberg (2012) uses aggregated imports of 62 HS-
6 categories of waste for a cross-section of 92 countries in 2004. He finds that the 10 largest exporters are OECD 
countries, while China, Turkey and South Korea are the largest importers. He also estimates a gravity model that 
includes a Basel ratification dummy, which is statistically significant and negative in two specifications. However, 
the author is not able to control for the endogeneity of the Basel-ratification in a cross-sectional setting, and for this 
reason, the results cannot be interpreted as causal. 
Subsequently, Kellenberg and Levinson (2014) estimate the effect of the Basel Convention and the subsequent Ban 
Amendment on waste trade (aggregate trade for 60 HS6 categories of waste products) using data for 117 countries 
over the period from 1988 to 2008. The main results, after controlling for multilateral resistance to trade and 
endogeneity by using panel data techniques and time invariant controls, show no clear evidence supporting the 
effectiveness of the Basel Convention and the Ban Amendment. In particular, no decrease in bilateral waste trade 
was observed for country pairs that have ratified the Basel Convention. Only when using a restricted sample, some 
evidence is found. 
 In our empirical application, we will follow a similar estimation strategy to Kellenberg and Levinson (2014) to 
analyse the effectiveness of the SC and RC in reducing trade in their respective targeted products. The main 
difference with our strategy is that we estimate the gravity model using trade at the 6-digit disaggregation level —
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without aggregating— to control for any unobserved heterogeneity that is country-pair-product specific and time 
invariant and that could represent factors such as product-specific differences in comparative advantages or in 
production techniques between a pair of countries. 
2.3. The Conventions 
The Basel Convention emerged as a result of the claim by developing countries, especially African countries, that 
waste was being improperly disposed of in their territories. This convention was adopted in 1989 and entered into 
force in May 1992. Its main objective was to control international shipments of hazardous waste and to foster the 
development of appropriate management techniques. 
Initially, the instrument used was a mandatory Prior Informed Consent (PIC). The available evidence shows that the 
Basel Convention was not a strong enough commitment to reassure all involved parties. It drew further criticism 
from developing countries for the fact that the PIC provision of the Basel Convention legitimated a waste trade that 
had previously been illegal (Kellenberg, 2012). As a result, a few signatory countries added the Ban Amendment in 
1994. Nevertheless, this Amendment, which was intended as a ban on all waste trade from OECD countries to non-
OECD countries, is still not enforced today. This means that there may still be hazardous waste shipments to 
developing countries from industrialized ones, especially since the United States, one of the largest waste exporters, 
has not yet ratified the Basel Convention (Kellenberg, 2012). Moreover, its effectiveness is also unclear according to 
Kellenberg and Levinson (2014). 
On the other hand, there is great awareness about the potential threat of products such as HCs and POPs. Some of 
these products are more production by-products than dangerous waste in its purest sense, but they have a l s o  been 
linked to health and environmental problems. The RC and SC emerged in response to specific problems posed by 
these products, which we will discuss in greater detail below.  
The urgent need to control and restrict trade in these substances stems from the fact that exposure to some pollutants 
poses a major health risk around the world, though these risks are generally higher in developing countries, where 
poverty and lack of investment in modern technology combined with weak environmental regulations cause greater 
pollution-related health problems (Briggs, 2003). More specifically, Johnson (1997) states that uncontrolled 
hazardous waste and other unplanned releases of hazardous substances into the environment are a concern due to the 
impact on human health and the ecological damage caused. Infants and young children are the most vulnerable to 
these effects (Gavidia et al., 2009). 
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Scientific studies have also linked POP exposure to declining populations, diseases and abnormalities in a number of 
wildlife species. Wildlife can also act as sentinels for human health, indicating the potential effects on humans. Some 
evidence has led scientists to investigate POP exposure in humans; it is known that people are mainly exposed to 
POPs through contaminated foods, although less common sources of exposure include drinking contaminated water 
and direct contact with the chemicals. In people and other mammals alike, POPs can be transferred through the 
placenta and breast milk5 to developing offspring.6  
The impressive growth in chemical production and trade, and the consequent potential risks posed by dangerous 
chemicals and pesticides, ultimately led to the adoption of the RC. It was the result of a joint initiative of the Food 
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). In the 1980s, the two 
UN organizations had already started to develop and promote voluntary information-exchange programmes on HCs 
and pesticides. Two of the first voluntary codes of conduct in support of food security and human health were the 
“International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides”, launched in 1985 in an FAO Conference, 
and the “London Guidelines for the Exchange of Information on Chemicals in International Trade”, set up by UNEP 
in 1987. As a next step, UNEP and FAO jointly launched the voluntary Prior Informed Consent (PIC) procedure in 
1989, which provided governments with the necessary information to make informed decisions on their future 
imports. However, given that developing countries were particularly vulnerable and lacked the appropriate 
infrastructure to gather information about the dangerous products and to monitor the import and use of these 
chemicals, a call for a legally binding instrument on the PIC procedure was made at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992. 
As a result, in 1998, the text of the Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous 
Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade was completed, ratification began in 1999 (see Table A1 in the 
Appendix for ratification dates by country) and i t  entered into force in 2004, at which time it became legally 
binding for its parties.  
According to the text of the RC, it has two main objectives. The first is to establish standards of conduct for all 
public and private entities engaged in, or associated with, the distribution and use of pesticides and to promote shared 
                                                          
5
 It should be noted, however, that despite this potential exposure, the known benefits of breastfeeding far outweigh the suspected 
risks. 
 
6
 "Persistent Organic Pollutants: A Global Issue, A Global Response" (United States Environmental Protection Agency. Content 
created in 2002 and updated in December 2009.), https://www.epa.gov/international-cooperation/persistent-organic-pollutants-
global-issue-global-response. 
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responsibility and cooperation among the parties,7 in order to protect human health and the environment from 
potential harm. The second objective is to facilitate information exchange about the characteristics of the HCs 
targeted by the Convention, provide the necessary input for the national decision-making process on exports and 
imports of these chemicals, and disseminate this information to all parties. Countries have a maximum period of nine 
months to prepare a response on the future import of a targeted product. 
The targeted products, which include 28 hazardous pesticides and 11 other chemicals, are all products that are 
banned or severely restricted by a party. Annex III of the RC contains a list of products covered by the Convention. 
A copy of that list can be found in Table A.2 in the Appendix. Once a chemical is included in Annex III, a "decision 
guidance document" (DGD) containing information concerning the chemical and the regulatory decisions to ban or 
severely restrict its use for health or environmental reasons, is circulated to all parties. Examples of the products 
listed are pesticides such as insecticides, fungicides, herbicides and parasiticides (used to fight insects, fungi, weeds 
and parasitic worms, respectively). A particular property of some HCs is that they reduce the flammability of 
products. Food is the primary source of exposure, mainly through animal products such as fish, meat, eggs and dairy 
products. These substances are undesirable due to their persistence in the environment (long life), bioaccumulation 
potential, high toxicity and ability to travel long distances via atmospheric transport. 
The chemical review committee (CRC) is the subsidiary body in charge of assessing which products should be 
subject to the PIC procedure. The procedure is similar to that of the early days of the Basel Convention; parties are 
allowed to exchange those HCs that are the subject of a prior agreement between the parties involved. Although the 
RC does not yet include an explicit ban on the products traded, the importers can decide against importing a given 
product subject to the PIC procedure (see the next two paragraphs).  
The obligations assumed upon ratifying the RC concern the future imports of chemicals listed in Annex III (Art. 10 
of the convention). Ratifying parties must submit any import response to the secretariat. A database with all import 
responses submitted by the parties is available on the convention’s website. It can be seen from the database that 
most countries’ final decision for most chemicals is “no consent to import”. 
The second convention we cover in this paper, the SC, was adopted in 2001 and entered into force in May 2004. It 
covers chemicals that are highly toxic, persistent, bio-accumulate and move long distances in the environment 
(POPs). The main aim of the convention is to restrict or eliminate the production and use of all intentionally 
                                                          
7
 "Scope of the Chemicals and Waste Subprogramme" (UNEP and Harmful Substances at a Glance, Division of Technology, 
Industry and Economics, United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) International Environment House. June 2010), 
http://www.unep.org/chemicalsandwaste/About/tabid/258/Default.aspx. 
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produced POPs and to minimize unintentionally produced POPs (e.g. dioxins and furans). The list of products 
subject to the convention includes the pesticides used on various crops (aldrin, chlordane, dieldrin, endrin, 
heptachlor, hexachlorobenzene (HCB), mirex and toxaphene) and the industrial chemical polychlorinated biphenyls 
(PCBs), with the latter slated for elimination. Both types of chemicals have unforeseen effects on human health 
and the environment. 
The subsidiary body responsible for assessing whether additional products should be subject to the convention and 
for making recommendations is the Persistent Organic Pollutants Review Committee (POPRC).  
Among the intentionally produced POPs are chemicals used in agriculture, disease control, manufacturing 
or industrial processes (e.g., those used in electrical transformers and large capacitors, such as hydraulic 
and heat exchange fluids, and additives in paints and lubricants) and DDT, which is still used to control 
malaria-bearing mosquitoes in some parts of the world. Conversely, dioxins are unintentionally produced 
as a result of some industrial processes and from combustion (e.g. municipal and medical waste 
incineration and backyard burning of trash).8 
Regarding the obligations of the parties to the SC, they must take the necessary measures to eliminate the production 
and use of the chemicals listed under Annex A, to restrict the production and use of those listed under Annex B and 
to reduce the release of those listed under Annex C. 
The parties are also obliged to ensure that the export and import of POPs listed in Annex A (see Table A.3 in the 
Appendix) or B of the convention, comply with the strict requirements laid out.9 In particular, imports are only 
allowed for the purpose of environmentally sound disposal or for a specific use permitted for the party under the 
convention, whereas exports are only permitted when safer alternatives are not available in the market. Nevertheless, 
there is no specific procedure defined under the SC for the international trade of POPs. In cases where a POP falls 
within the scope of the Basel Convention or the RC (for example, aldrin), the control procedures provided by these 
conventions apply to the import, transit or export of the corresponding product. Moreover, exporting to a country not 
party to the convention is only allowed on the condition that the importing country provides an annual certification to 
the exporting party guaranteeing that releases will be prevented or minimized, that the chemicals will be disposed of 
                                                          
8
 https://www.epa.gov/international-cooperation/persistent-organic-pollutants-global-issue-global-response#pops. 
9
 Parties must take measures to restrict the production and use of the chemicals listed under Annex B for any applicable 
acceptable purposes and/or in light of any specific exemptions listed in the Annex. Annex B includes the pesticide DDT and the 
industrial chemical perfluorooctane sulfonic acid (PFOS), its salts and perfluorooctane sulfonyl fluoride (PFOS-F).  
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in an environmentally-sound manner and that the provisions of Annex B will be respected. A registry of specific 
exemptions is maintained and regularly updated with decisions adopted after the Conference of the Parties, and also 
provides information on expired exceptions (Art. 4 of the convention). A list of exemptions is provided in parts VI 
and VII of Annex A, as well in Annex B. In addition to these obligations concerning POPs in Annexes A and B, 
parties must also take measures to reduce the unintentional release of POPs listed under Annex C10, with the aim of 
minimizing and eventually eliminating their use. 
Article 3 of the convention suggests potential measures to reduce or eliminate releases from intentional production or 
use of POPs. The measures restrict the production and use of products in Annex B, while for products in Annex A 
(see Table A.3 in the Appendix), production and local use are prohibited along with imports and exports of those 
products. 
Summarizing, the conventions provide explicit lists of products and focus on the reduction or elimination of 
production and trade in said products. We thus restrict the sample of products in our analysis of trade in hazardous 
substances to only these products. This allows us to analyse the two existent provisions in place for these 
conventions —the PIC used in the RC and the Ban (elimination) in the SC— and facilitates comparison with results 
from previous studies, particularly Kellenberg and Levinson (2014). The SC is expected to have had a greater impact 
than the RC due to the stronger provisions (Ban) in the former.  
 
3.  Empirical Strategy  
3.1. Data and Variables 
The first step in evaluating the effectiveness of the conventions is to correctly identify the products involved. The 
targeted products are identified using the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System, generally 
referred to as the Harmonized System (HS) of tariff nomenclature. Since there were a number of changes in the HS 
product codes during the period under study (1995-2012), we use different versions of the HS classification —
namely the 1992, 1996, 2002, 2007, 2012 versions— and track the same products over time. To select the products 
affected by the two conventions, we take the list of products published on their respective websites.11 The text of the 
                                                          
10
 Chemicals listed under Annex C are hexachlorobenzene (HCB), pentachlorobenzene, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB), polychlorinated 
dibenzo-p-dioxins (PCDD), polychlorinated dibenzofurans (PCDF) and polychlorinated naphthalenes. 
11
 http://www.pic.int/ and http://chm.pops.int/, respectively. 
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RC, written before 1998, refers to the HS codes in the 1996-HS system (6 digits); those codes are then converted into 
1992-HS using BACI12.  
In the case of the SC, the products covered are published in the Chemical Abstracts Service Registry Number 
(CASRN), with the corresponding product codes. These CASRN codes were converted into the 2012-HS codes (6 
digits), and then re-converted into 1992-HS codes.13 
Import flows in tonnes, as well as other gravity variables (distance, common border, common language and colonial 
links), are extracted from the BACI dataset compiled by CEPII for 88 exporters and 88 importers between 1995 and 
2012. GDP and population data are from the World Development Indicators, while the RTA and common currency 
dummies are from De Sousa (2012). 
The dummy variables representing ratification of the SC and RC have been constructed using the information 
available on their respective websites, as shown in Table A1 in the Appendix. The year of ratification has been used 
in the empirical analysis irrespective of the specific month in which the ratification was completed. Table 1 presents 
summary statistics of the main variables. 
The dependent variable deserves further explanation. It has been constructed using the volume imported of the 
specific products (at the 6-digit disaggregation level) using the 1992-HS6 codes provided in Table A2 for the 
products targeted by the RC, and the definitions listed in Table A3 for the products targeted by the SC. It is worth 
mentioning that there are many countries that do not trade certain products for the entire period under study and 
hence those countries are excluded from the main analysis. Some of the countries that trade certain products targeted 
by the two conventions only report trade for a few of the years under analysis.  
Table 1.  Summary statistics 
Variable       Obs.*     Mean Std. Dev.            Min              Max 
Rotterdam Convention 
 
   Ln(imports) 209.951 2.718 2,843 -6,911 12,497 
Importer ratifies  209.951 0,469                0.499  0 1 
Exporter Ratifies 209.951 0,51                0.500  0 1 
                                                          
12
 BACI is the world trade database developed by CEPII (Center for International Prospective Studies, referred to by its French acronym CEPII), 
which provides a high level of product disaggregation. http://www.cepii.fr/cepii/. BACI trade data is constructed using a procedure that reconciles 
the declarations of the exporter and the importer. The BACI trade data are sourced from the United Nations Statistical Division (COMTRADE 
database). 
13
 The European Commission website has a tax and customs union section that contains a customs inventory of chemical 
substances, ECICS. It also contains a guide to the classification of chemicals in the combined nomenclature (HS  codes at the 6- digit 
level of disaggregation) and the corresponding Chemical Abstracts Service Registry Number (CASRN) classification used by the  Stockholm 
Convention.  More information about the procedure is available from the authors. For the conversion from CAS codes to HS6 codes, please refer 
to: http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs and for the conversion from 2012-HS6 codes to 1992-HS6, the information is available at: 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/trade/conversions/HS. 
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Both Ratify 209.951 0,369                0.482  0 1 
 
     
Ln(gdp) importer 209.951 12,017 1,890 7,242 1,660 
Ln(gdp) exporter 209.951 13,304 1,615 7,242 1,660 
Ln(distance) 209.951 8,188 1,095 4,742 9,886 
Contiguity 209.951 0,100 0,300 0 1 
Common language 209.951 0,179 0,384 0 1 
Colony ties 209.951 0,027 0,161 0 1 
RTA 209.951 0,394 0,489 0 1 
WTO 209.951 1,809 0,416 0 2 
Common currency 209.951 0,054 0,225 0 1 
 
  
   Stockholm Convention 
 
   Ln(imports)  91.673    1,793 3,073 -6,908 1,308 
Importer ratifies   91.673    0,426 0,495 0 1 
Exporter Ratifies  91.673    0,426 0,495 0 1 
Both Ratify  91.673    0,337 0,473 0 1 
 
  
   Ln(gdp) importer  91.673     12,429     1,754    7,242    16,598    
Ln(gdp) exporter  91.673     13,640     1,426    7,464    16,598    
Ln(distance)  91.673     8,237     1,088     4,742     9,881    
Contiguity  91.673     0,097     0,296    0 1 
Common language  91.673     0,151     0,358    0 1 
Colony ties  91.673     0,018     0,132    0 1 
RTA  91.673     0,400     0,490    0 1 
WTO  91.673     1,813     0,412    0 2 
Common currency  91.673     0,063     0,242    0 1 
Note:  * Number of observations differs because of disaggregation level; when aggregating completely we obtain 137,808 observations 
(88*87*18). 
 
3.2. Stylized facts 
To illustrate our data, we plotted total annual shipments of HCs and POPs in Figure 1. In this figure, imports of both 
HCs and POPs show a positive trend over time and it can be observed that a large part of non-OECD countries’ 
imports come from OECD countries. It also indicates a more pronounced increase in the total amount imported after 
2004 in comparison to changes over time in imports before this date.  However, when looking at the flow from 
OECD countries to non-OECD countries, the volume of imports levels out after 2004 on the left-hand side of the 
figure (HCs) and increases only slightly on the right-hand side (POPs). Since the main question at hand is whether 
developed countries have indeed reduced the amount of these products exported to developing countries as a 
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consequence of ratifying and subsequently adopting the conventions, we now present, in Figure 2, the trends in 
imports for the different groups of countries before and after ratification, and compare the figures for ratifying and 
non-ratifying countries. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Trade over time of HCs and POPs (BACI) 
 
Figure 2 shows the average annual shipments of HCs and POPs, separately for when the importer ratifies and for 
when the exporter ratifies, as well as for when either of the two ratifies and the flow goes from OECD to non-OECD 
countries. The figure shows aggregation of all products and plotting the average bilateral imports by year, for the 
given group of countries. We define year zero as the point in time when the convention was ratified by the exporter 
or the importer.  
In the case of HCs, when it is only the importer or only the exporter that ratifies, a big drop is shown the year after 
the convention is ratified (and consequently enters into force), followed five years later by an increase. This suggests 
that countries, respecting the legal framework, may have started to comply with the PIC procedure and trade in HCs 
when back to normal levels. For cases in which the flow goes from North to South and the importer ratifies the RC, 
the amount of HCs imported shows a steady decrease in the years before ratification, before stabilizing. Conversely, 
when using the date when the exporter ratifies and for the same flow (North-South) a sharp decrease in the amount 
traded is observed at year 1, with quantities of HCs remaining low after that date.  
Concerning POPs (right-hand side of Figure 2), when the exporter ratifies, the results indicate a sharp increase at 
years 1 and 2, followed by a sharp decrease. However, when the flow is North-South, there are no observations after 
year 1 indicating that there are zero imports from OECD to non-OECD countries. This could be explained by the fact 
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that the convention imposes a clear ban or import prohibition rather than simply controlling the flows.  This is 
already a sign of the effectiveness of the convention. 
When using the date the importer ratifies, a slight decrease in imports of POPs is observed at year 1, followed by a 
steady increase, whereas for the same flow for OECD to non-OECD trade only, a steady decrease is observed that 
had already started four years before ratification, with trade remaining at low levels thereafter. 
 
Figure 2.  Trade in HCs and POPs before and after ratification  of the RC and SC 
 
The analysis of the total annual shipments of HCs and POPs made 10 years before and after countries ratified the 
conventions reveals an interesting picture for both conventions (Figure 2). Since Figures 1 and 2 only show trends in 
the data, we aim to employ a modelling strategy to investigate whether the conventions are reducing or not imports 
of the products that they target. 
3.3. Model specification 
The gravity model of trade is considered the workhorse in estimating the effect of policy-based bilateral agreements 
on bilateral trade flows (Feenstra, 2016). In particular, it has been widely used since the 1960s to estimate the effects 
of free trade agreements (FTAs), economic integration agreements (EIAs) and monetary unions (MUs).  More 
recently, it has also been used to estimate the effects of MEAs on trade (Kellenberg and Levinson, 2014) and in most 
cases the methodology has been borrowed from the literature on trade agreements. We base our main state-of-the-art 
specification of the gravity model on Baier and Bergstrand (2007), but due to the shorter time span for which MEAs 
have been in force, we will only be able to capture short-term MEA effects. As explained by Baier and Bergstrand 
(2007), IEAs can take more than 10 years for their full impact on bilateral trade to materialize; since the MEAs under 
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analysis have been in force only since 2004 and because the dataset covers until 2012 we will not be able to estimate 
the long-run effects at this point in time.14 
An important issue in the estimation of the effects of MEAs on trade is the fact that self-selection of country pairs 
into MEAs may create an endogeneity bias in the estimates. For instance, trade partners that ratify the conventions 
might be those for which trade in HCs or POPs is not growing. As suggested by Baier and Bergstrand (2007), panel 
data techniques can be used to avoid endogeneity bias by incorporating bilateral effects in a log-level specification.  
A second issue that is well known in the trade literature is the need to include the so-called multilateral resistance 
terms (MRT, Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2004) in the model, which represents the relative-price differences across 
countries with respect to all of their trading partners. Since these factors vary over time in a panel data framework, 
they could be proxied using time-varying exporter and importer fixed effects, which will capture not only price 
effects, but also all the unobservable heterogeneity that varies over time for each origin and for each destination. In 
what follows, we specify a theoretically founded (or structural) gravity model of trade that will be estimated in the 
next section.  
According to the underlying theory that has been reformulated and extended by Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003), 
our model assumes a constant elasticity of substitution and product differentiation by place of origin. In addition, 
prices differ among locations due to symmetric bilateral trade costs. The reduced form of the model is specified as: M୧୨t = Y౟tYౠtYtW ( t౟ౠtP౟tPౠt)ଵ-σ           (1) 
where Mijt are the bilateral imports from country i to country j in year t, and Yit , Yjt and YW are the GDP of the  
exporting  country, the  importing  country and  the world in year t, respectively. tijt denotes trade costs between the 
exporter  and the importer in year t, and Pit and Pjt  are the so-called MRT. σ is the elasticity of substitution between 
all goods. 
The empirical specification in log-linear form is given by: ln �௜௝� = �� �௜� + �� �௝� − �� ��� + ሺ1 − �ሻ�� �௜௝� − ሺ1 − �ሻ�� �௜� − ሺ1 − �ሻ�� �௝�      (2) 
The estimation of equation (2) is not straightforward due to the presence of trade costs and MRT.  
In the gravity literature, the trade cost function tijt, is assumed to be a linear function of a number of trade barriers, 
namely, the time-invariant determinants of trade flows, including distance, common border, common colonial past 
                                                          
14
 In any case, the agreements we analyze here imply a reduction or elimination of trade in the targeted products and hence, the short-run effects 
are more relevant in this setting than the case of IEAs, in which the agreements favor trade increases and could lead to trade creation in new 
products that takes time to materialize. 
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and common language dummies, and the time-varying policy variables (membership in multilateral agreements such 
as RTAs, MEAs, WTO, etc.). It takes the form: 
             (3) 
Substitution of the trade cost function (3) into equation (2) and adding the product dimension as well as group, 
product and time dummy variables and an idiosyncratic error term gives the following specification: 
 lnሺM୧୨୩tሻ = Ƚ଴ + Ƚଵ ln Y୧t + Ƚଶ ln Y୨t + ȽଷlnDist୧୨ + ȽସContig୧୨ + ȽହComlang୧୨ + Ƚ଺Comcol୧୨+Ƚ଻RTA୧୨t +Ƚ଼WTO୧୨t + ȽଽComcur୧୨t + Ƚଵ଴MEA୧୨t + Ƚଵଵ ∑ Group୧୨g + ∑ d୧,y I୧y + ∑ d୨y I୨y + γt+θ୩ + u୧୨୩t    
 (4) 
here Mijkt is the quantity imported (in tonnes) of the products (k) subject to each convention shipped from country i to 
country j in year t; ln Distij denotes geographical distance between country i and country j in logs; Comlangij and 
Comcolij take the value of one when countries i and j share an official language or have ever had a colonial 
relationship, respectively, and zero otherwise; Contigij takes the value of one when the trading countries share a 
border, zero otherwise; RTAijt takes the value of one when the trading countries are members of a regional trade 
agreement, zero otherwise; WTOijt takes the value of one if country i or country j are WTO members  and  two if 
both are members;  and Comcurijt takes  the value of one when countries i and j belong to the same currency union. 
MEAijt takes the value of one when the trading countries i and j have ratified the corresponding convention (RC for 
the Rotterdam Convention and SC for the Stockholm Convention)15, γt denotes a set of year dummies that proxy for 
business cycle and other time-variant common factors (globalization) that affect all trade flows in the same manner. 
Σg Groupij are g=3 dummy variables that represent trade from OECD to non-OECD countries, from non-OECD to 
OECD countries and from OECD to OECD countries, respectively, in order to partially control for group-specific 
bilateral unobservable heterogeneity. Since the model is estimated using product-level trade data, we add a k 
subscript that denotes a given product at the 6-digit HS disaggregation level and also add dummy variables that are 
product specific to control for any unobserved product characteristics that are constant across bilateral flows and 
over time. In line with recent gravity literature, the price terms (ln Pit, ln Pij) MRT are modelled as time-varying 
country-specific dummies. Hence, in equation (4) we also introduce two sets of dummies, diy and djy, for exporters 
and importers. We construct country-and-time dummies that vary every five years (y) instead of yearly (t) in an 
                                                          
15
 In the estimations without price effects that are presented in the next section, three membership dummies are included: the 
“importer (or exporter) ratifies” variable is encoded as a dummy variable equal to one if the importer (or exporter) ratifies 
(independently of what the exporter does) and zero otherwise. The “both ratify” dummy takes the value of one when the two trade 
partners are ratifying countries in a given year. 
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attempt to account for factors that vary slowly over time and are country specific such as domestic environmental 
regulations, political stability and industrial policies (Gylfason et al. (2015)). 
Finally, in an additional specification, rather than adding the usual time-invariant gravity variables to control for 
differences in trade costs (distance, etc.), we use country-pair-product fixed effects γ୧୨୩  to control for bilateral 
unobserved characteristics. The equation is given by: lnሺM୧୨୩tሻ = γ୧୨୩+ȾଵFTA୧୨t + ȾଶWTO୧୨t + ȾଷComcur୧୨t + ȾସMEA୧୨t + ∑ d୧,y I୧y + ∑ d୨y I୨y + u୧୨୩t (5) 
Our estimation strategy follows Baier and Bergstrand (2007), Gylfason et al. (2015) and Head and Mayer (2014) by 
using country-pair-product fixed effects to control for endogeneity of the agreement effects (introduced in equation 
(5)), as well as exporter-and-time and importer-and-time dummy variables to control for MRT (already introduced in 
equation (4) and kept in (5)). In this way, the gravity models that we estimate in this paper control for the possibility 
of endogeneity present in the ratification variables, which could arise if countries self-select themselves into both the 
ratification process and the time of ratification, depending on their volume of trade in the pollutant in question. In 
summary, in the most comprehensive specification, given by equation (5), we exploit the panel nature of the data and 
include three sets of fixed effects (dummy variables) that account for time-varying unobserved factors for the 
exporter and the importer separately, and across the country-pair-product dimension (country-pair-product or 
“dyadic”-product fixed effects). For comparison, we present the traditional gravity model estimations with economic 
and bilateral variables and product fixed effects (instead of dyadic-product fixed effects) and with common time 
effects instead of MRT.  
 
4.  Main Results 
In this section, the estimation results are presented separately for each convention. Table 2 presents the results 
obtained for the RC and Table 3 the results for the SC. 
Table 2 presents the results obtained by estimating equation (4) above with the inclusion of dummy variables for 
three groups of trading partners (OECD to non-OECD, OECD to OECD and non-OECD to OECD), as well as 
exporter and importer dummy variables for our target variable (RC ratification) and its interaction with the group of 
OECD and non-OECD trading partners (North-South dummy). This latter term is added to analyse whether there was 
a decrease in the amount of trade between OECD and non-OECD members that ratified, following ratification. This 
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could occur if the ratification process exerts a greater impact on the countries that have to adapt to more markedly 
different environmental regulations on standards of use of these HCs.  
More specifically, for comparative purposes, columns (1) and (2) present estimates of the traditional gravity model 
(specification (4) of the gravity model but without country-and-time dummies (MRT)). In column (1) group 
dummies are included, whereas in column (2) the interaction between the North-South dummy and ratification status 
are added. Columns (3) and (4) incorporate MRT with and without interaction terms, respectively. Column (5) 
presents estimates of equation (5), which includes “dyadic-” or bilateral-product time-invariant fixed effects and 
group dummies and finally, column (6) adds additional interaction terms (between the North-South dummy and 
ratification status, as in columns (2) and (4)).  
 
Table 2.  Main Results for the Rotterdam Convention 
Dep. Variable:  
ln bilateral Imports  Gravity controls& t, k FE Gravity controls k FE&MRT MRT & ijk FE 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
      
              
OECD to non-OECD -1.104*** -1.115*** 3.674*** 3.682*** 
(0.0436) (0.0487) (0.506) (0.508) 
OECD to OECD -1.648*** -1.642*** 7.030*** 6.962*** 
(0.0560) (0.0561) (0.595) (0.597) 
Non-OECD  to OECD -1.272*** -1.265*** 2.755*** 2.728*** 
(0.0599) (0.0599) (0.318) (0.318) 
Importer ratifies RC 0.106** 0.0109 
(0.0432) (0.0511) 
Exporter ratifies RC 0.0655* 0.148*** 
(0.0396) (0.0470) 
Both ratify RC -0.142*** -0.134** -0.0548 -0.0447 -0.0542** -0.0310 
(0.0474) (0.0599) (0.0363) (0.0424) (0.0218) (0.0268) 
Imp. ratifies RC *OECD 
to non-OECD 0.295*** 0.0426 -0.00195 
(0.0738) (0.0681) (0.0477) 
Exp. ratifies RC * 
OECD to non-OECD -0.184*** -0.111** -0.0730** 
(0.0550) (0.0522) (0.0359) 
Both ratify RC * OECD 
to non-OECD -0.0740 -0.0440 -0.0513 
(0.0895) (0.0825) (0.0584) 
Observations 209,951 209,951 209,951 209,951 209,951 209,951 
R-squared 0.255 0.255 0.349 0.349 0.067 0.067 
Time dummies YES YES - - - - 
Product dummies YES YES YES YES - - 
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Country-and-time 
dummies - - YES YES YES YES 
Dyadic-sector fixed 
effects - - - - YES YES 
Ratification-country 
group interaction terms - YES - YES - YES 
Number of ijk         25,9 25,9 
Note: Robust standard errors are in brackets, ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. In column 
(1)-(4) other gravity controls, namely distance, common border, common language and colonial ties, are also included, but the coefficients are 
not shown to save space.  Full results can be found in Table A.4 in the Appendix. The “importer (or exporter) ratifies” variable is encoded as a 
dummy variable equal to one if the importer (or exporter) ratifies (independently of what the exporter does) and zero otherwise. The “both ratify” 
dummy takes the value of one when the two trade partners are ratifying countries in a given year. i denotes importer, j denotes exporter and k 
denotes sector. 
 
The results of the model including interactions show that lower volumes are shipped when the exporter ratifies the 
RC (row (8), columns (2), (4) and (6)). That is, the interaction between the ratification dummy and the group dummy 
OECD to non-OECD countries is negative and statistically significant. The magnitude of the effect is a cumulative 
decrease in imports of HCs of about 7 percent (column (6)), though given the relatively short time span since 
ratification, this should be considered a short-run effect. These results highlight the importance of the exporter 
ratifying the convention. The additional gravity controls have the expected signs and indicate that countries with 
higher GDPs, as well as those with a shared border, official language or colonial history, trade more.16 
The results shown in columns 1 and 2, which include group dummies but not bilateral-product (ijk) fixed effects, are 
biased due to the fact that we only partially control for endogeneity issues and do not control for MRT.  Similarly, 
the results shown in columns (3) and (4) include the MRT but still do not incorporate the bilateral-product fixed 
effects. For these reasons, we focus on the interpretation of the results in columns (5) and (6). Whereas in column (5) 
the dummy “both ratify” is negative and statistically significant, in column (6) it is indeed the interaction dummy that 
captures this effect, meaning that trade from OECD countries to non-OECD countries is significantly lower when the 
exporter ratifies. Interestingly, the estimated effects are similar to those found in columns (2) and (4), but lower in 
magnitude, confirming our suspicion of a possible endogeneity bias, which in this case magnifies the effect. 
Table 3 shows the results for the SC regression obtained for the gravity model estimated using the imported products 
that are affected by this convention. The structure of the table is similar to Table 2. Columns (1) and (2) are for 
specification (4) of the gravity model but without country-and-time dummies (MRT), (3) and (4) include MRT and 
columns (5) and (6) also incorporate bilateral-product time-invariant fixed effects as in equation (4). As in Table 2, 
interactions between the North-South dummy and ratification dummies are also added in columns (2), (4) and (6). 
                                                          
16
 Full results tables can be found in Table A4 in the Appendix. 
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Table 3.  Main results for  the Stockholm Convention 
 
Dep. Variable:  
Ln Bilateral Imports  
 Gravity controls& t, k 
FE Gravity controls k FE&MRT MRT & ijk FE 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
      
              
OECD to non-
OECD -1.188*** -1.221*** 4.913*** 5.051*** 
(0.0784) (0.0838) (0.832) (0.837) 
OECD to OECD -1.427*** -1.428*** 9.344*** 9.469*** 
(0.0961) (0.0961) (0.989) (0.992) 
Non-OECD to 
OECD -0.405*** -0.407*** 4.545*** 4.553*** 
(0.109) (0.109) (0.552) (0.551) 
Importer ratifies 
STO -0.147* -0.163* 
(0.0801) (0.0931) 
Exporter ratifies 
STO 0.237*** 0.254*** 
(0.0765) (0.0916) 
Both ratify SC -0.0208 -0.0413 0.00223 -0.0436 0.0143 0.0209 
(0.0871) (0.109) (0.0650) (0.0732) (0.0381) (0.0439) 
Imp. ratifies SC* 
OECD to non-
OECD 0.0613 -0.253** -0.157** 
(0.113) (0.103) (0.0798) 
Exp. ratifies SC* 
OECD to non-
OECD -0.0509 0.0286 -0.0820 
(0.103) (0.0877) (0.0601) 
Both ratify SC * 
OECD to non-
OECD 0.0721 0.267** 0.0887 
(0.149) (0.133) (0.0988) 
Observations 91,673 91,673 91,673 91,673 91,673 91,673 
R-squared 0.219 0.219 0.318 0.318 0.069 0.069 
Time dummies YES YES - - - - 
Product dummies YES YES YES YES - - 
Country-and-time 
dummies - - YES YES YES YES 
Dyadic-sector fixed 
effects - - - - YES YES 
Ratification-
country group 
interaction terms - YES - YES - YES 
Number of ijk         11,675 11,675 
Note: Robust standard errors are in brackets, ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. In column 
(1)-(4) other gravity controls, namely distance, common border, common language and colonial ties, are also included, but the coefficients are 
not shown to save space.  Full results can be found in Table A.5 in the Appendix. The “importer (or exporter) ratifies” variable is encoded as a 
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dummy variable equal to one if the importer (or exporter) ratifies (independently of what the exporter does) and zero otherwise. The “both ratify” 
dummy takes the value of one when the two trade partners are ratifying countries in a given year. i denotes importer, j denotes exporter and k 
denotes sector. 
 
The main results differ from those found for the RC. This is not surprising given the different aims of the 
conventions and the products affected. In particular, contrary to what we found in Table 2, significant effects are 
found in Table 3 (row (7), columns (4) and (6)) when the importer ratifies the SC and the flow is from OECD to 
non-OECD countries. It shows a sharp decrease in POPs shipped from OECD to non-OECD countries after the non-
OECD importer has ratified the convention. Comparing the results in columns (4) and (6) —with and without 
bilateral-product fixed effects— it can be observed that the magnitude of the effect decreased from 0.253 to 0.157, 
indicating the importance of controlling for endogeneity in the model to avoid biased results. Similar to Table 2, the 
rest of the gravity controls have the expected signs and a reasonable magnitude.17 It is not surprising that the SC has 
a greater effect, especially since this study focuses on the products that are to be eliminated and that are therefore 
subject to stronger provisions. 
To assess whether there is an aggregation bias when the estimations are carried out with data that is more aggregated, 
we performed similar estimations summing all flows at the 4-digit level for the RC, at the 2-digit level for the SC18 
and finally with completely aggregated data.  
The main results for the target variables are shown in Table 4 and full results are in the Appendix (Tables A6 and A7 
for 2- and 4-digit aggregation, respectively, and A8 and A9 for full aggregation). When aggregating the data, we sum 
the quantities of all HCs imported in the case of the RC and all POPs for the SC; not distinguishing between products 
we might incur in a bias due to some under or over-representation of a specific product in the sample. To our 
knowledge, previous research has mainly analysed waste in an aggregated manner. Our results show that the use of 
disaggregated data allows us to better isolate and identify the magnitude of the effect. In particular, the results from 
aggregating all products (column (2) of Table 4) indicate that when the exporter ratifies the RC and trade flows go 
from OECD to non-OECD countries, imports of HCs are around 15.7 percent19 lower (compared with 7 percent 
obtained using HS-6 product-level data). 
Concerning the SC, there is no significant effect at the fully aggregated level, as shown in column (4) of Table 4, 
indicating that the average effect is not statistically different from zero. However, the effect using the 2-digit 
                                                          
17
 Full results, including the coefficients for all variables included in the model can be found in Appendix 5.  
18
 For the Stockholm Convention, it is not straightforward to estimate at the 4-digit disaggregation level. Performing the 
estimation at the 2-digit level keeps the product disaggregation but to some extent mitigates the zero problem. 
19
 The number is calculated as [exp(-0.17)-1]*100=15.7%. 
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disaggregation level is slightly higher than that found at the 6-digit level and also statistically significant (0.195 
versus 0.157). This highlights the importance of using disaggregated trade data when estimating the effects of the 
conventions in order to be able to properly isolate the effects and account for possible unobserved factors that affect 
specific products differently.  
Table 4. Summary table of main results at different aggregation levels 
 
Dep. Variable:  
ln Imports 
Rotterdam Convention Stockholm Convention 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Disaggregation 
level: 
Both Ratify Exp. Rat x OECD-
Non-OECD 
Both Ratify Imp. Rat x OECD-
Non-OECD 
6-digit -0.0542** -0.0730** 0.0143 -0.157** 
2/4-digit -0.0134*** -0.102* -0.0033 -0.195** 
Aggregated -0.119*** -0.171*** -0.0294 -0.172 
Note: The coefficients shown are from columns (5) and (6) of Tables 2 and 3 for the first row, Tables A6 and A7 for the second row and Tables 
A8 and A9 for the last column. The “importer (or exporter) ratifies” variable is encoded as a dummy variable equal to one if the importer (or 
exporter) ratifies (independently of what the exporter does) and zero otherwise. The “both ratify” dummy takes the value of one when the two 
trade partners are ratifying countries in a given year. 
 
With respect to Kellenberg and Levinson (2014), there are three main differences in our analysis. First, our database 
contains fewer countries (88 versus 117) and highly disaggregated data, meaning that we have very detailed 
information concerning the type of product and that we can control for unobserved factors that are time invariant and 
product specific. In contrast, Kellenberg and Levinson (2014) aggregate all imports and apply the gravity model to 
the aggregated shipments. We claim that the use of data at the product level allows us to identify the effectiveness of 
the conventions without incurring an aggregation bias. We are also able to identify an ‘aggregation effect’, as 
described above, which indicates that results substantially differ depending on the degree of aggregation used in the 
estimations.  
Second, the time period is also likely to matter in explaining the different results obtained. Whereas Kellenberg and 
Levinson (2014) use trade data over the period from 1988 to 2008, our period of analysis runs from 1995 to 2012. 
The starting year is 1995 because positive trade flows are found for more countries beginning in the mid-1990s, and 
because our highly disaggregated data meant that we faced a trade-off between extending the time period back to 
past years or including more countries. In the end, we opted to include more countries.  
Finally, the treaties differ clearly in their scope and implementation strategy. We believe that the provisions defined 
in each convention play an important role. We suspect that imposing a ban (as in the SC for Annex A products) or a 
PIC system (as in the RC), or both at different times (as in the Basel Convention or for products subject to both the 
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RC and the SC) is likely to matter, since bans may be more effective in reducing trade of hazardous products. When 
comparing the results in Kellenberg and Levinson (2014) with those we find for aggregated data and the SC, we find 
neither a fundamental difference nor a statistically significant effect on imports. 
Our main model seeks to infer whether ratification influences imports by taking into account the ratification date of 
each country (countries ratify at different points in time): ratifying countries are included in the treatment group and 
the control group includes those that do not ratify at that moment or at any other time (countries that have not ratified 
the RC are Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Iceland, Malta, Tunisia, Turkey and the US, while those that have not 
ratified the SC are Israel, Italy, Malaysia, Malta and the US). Nevertheless, the conventions were not implemented 
until 2004, while the period of study runs from 1995 until 2012. See Table A1 for a list of countries, their ratification 
status and the date of ratification. In the next section, we analyse the timing of the impacts from ratifying the 
conventions to infer when the effects in terms of lower imports can be noted. 
5.  Robustness 
As a first robustness test, we estimate the model including interactions between the years and the ratification 
dummies. Results are shown in Tables 5 and 6 for the RC and SC, respectively. Next, we estimate regressions 
separating the sample into three groups of developing countries; see results in Table 7. In these three tables (5-7), we 
focus on the preferred model specification that uses the three sets of fixed effects (dyadic-product, origin-and-time 
and destination-and-time FE) and only the coefficients of the target variables are shown.  
The results obtained with time-varying treatment effects, before and after ratification of the RC, are shown in Table 
5.  
 
Table 5.   Time-varying ratification effects. The Rotterdam Convention 
Dep. Variable:  
ln Imports 
MRT & ijk FE 
 
Both Rat. Imp. Rat. NS Exp. Rat. NS Both Rat. NS 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Year     
2000 -0.0131 -0.121 0.0176 0.543 
 (0.193) (0.116) (0.0896) (0.385) 
2001 -0.111 0.0741 0.105* -0.0611 
 (0.113) (0.107) (0.0620) (0.258) 
2002 0.0693 -0.0225 0.0262 -0.133 
 (0.0554) (0.0640) (0.0498) (0.122) 
2003 -0.0962* 0.0606 -0.0272 0.000720 
 (0.0499) (0.0600) (0.0520) (0.110) 
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2004 -0.170*** 0.0673 -0.104** 0.0633 
 (0.0396) (0.0764) (0.0473) (0.103) 
2005 0.0101 0.124 -0.123 -0.0946 
 (0.0521) (0.0923) (0.0797) (0.117) 
2006 -0.0403 0.0717 -0.218*** 0.0284 
 (0.0527) (0.0947) (0.0824) (0.122) 
2007 0.0234 -0.00190 -0.121 0.000283 
 (0.0543) (0.0986) (0.0859) (0.130) 
2008 -0.0123 -0.0966 -0.245*** 0.167 
 (0.0571) (0.0973) (0.0933) (0.135) 
2009 0.00772 -0.179* -0.298*** 0.220 
 (0.0579) (0.0987) (0.0974) (0.140) 
2010 -0.0540 -0.0911 -0.357*** 0.144 
 (0.0698) (0.115) (0.116) (0.158) 
2011 -0.0616 -0.0736 -0.486*** 0.269 
 (0.0820) (0.126) (0.138) (0.183) 
2012 -0.0164 -0.137 -0.400*** 0.196 
 
(0.0853) (0.132) (0.145) (0.194) 
Note: Robust standard errors are in brackets, ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. Only the 
coefficients for the ratification dummies and interactions with the group dummy are shown. Both Rat. denotes interactions between time 
dummies and a dummy variable that takes the value of one when both countries ratify the convention, zero otherwise. Imp. Rat. denotes 
interactions between time dummies and a dummy variable that takes the value of one when the importer country ratifies the convention, zero 
otherwise. Exp. Rat. denotes interactions between time dummies and a dummy variable that takes the value of one when the exporter country 
ratifies the convention, zero otherwise Both Rat. NS denotes interactions between time dummies and a dummy variable that takes the value of 
one when both countries ratify the convention, zero otherwise. NS stands for North South meaning imports into non-OECD countries from 
OECD countries. i denotes importer, j denotes exporter and k denotes sector. 
 
The results indicate that the coefficients are mostly non-significant before 2004, and we observe only a single 
coefficient that is positive and significant at the 10 percent level in 2001 for the interaction between exporter ratifies 
and the North-South dummy (column (3), second row in Table 5). However, there are negative and significant 
effects in 2003 and 2004 when both countries ratify the convention (column (1), rows (4) and (5) in Table 5) and for 
most years from 2004 onwards, when the exporter ratifies and exports are from OECD to non-OECD countries. It is 
shown that the magnitude of the effects increased over time, with the highest coefficient in 2011 (-0.486), showing a 
lower level of imports in HCs for this trade flow (see also Figure 3 for a graphical representation of the time effects). 
Our interpretation of the positive effect in 2001 is that firms anticipated that both their country and other countries 
would ratify, and tried to trade as much of the targeted substances as possible before ratification.  
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Figure 3. Evolution over time of the coefficients in Table 5, column 3 
 
Note: Importer ratifies denotes interactions between time dummies and a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when 
importer country ratifies the convention zero otherwise. Exporter ratifies denotes interactions between time dummies and a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when exporter country ratifies the convention, zero otherwise. Both rat denotes 
interactions between time dummies and a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when both countries ratify the convention, 
zero otherwise. NS stand for North and South meaning imports of Non-OECD countries from OECD countries. Only the effects 
that were jointly significant are shown. 
 
Table 6 shows that in the case of the SC, imports were higher in 2002 when both countries ratify the convention 
(column (1)), whereas for the years after ratification, we only find significant and negative coefficients for the year 
2011 when the importer ratifies and exports go from OECD to non-OECD countries, and for the year 2012 for the 
same trade flow but when the exporter has ratified the convention. For this convention, there are also some negative 
and significant results for the year 2002 (column (4)). These could be interpreted as anticipation effects. 
 
Table 6.  Time-varying ratification effects.  The Stockholm Convention 
Dep. Variable:  
ln Imports 
MRT & ijk FE 
 
Both Rat. Imp. Rat. NS Exp. Rat. NS Both Rat. NS 
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) 
2002 0.188* 0.0117 0.119 -0.158* 
 (0.108) (0.198) (0.364) (0.0811) 
2003 -0.0381 -0.105 0.112 -0.104 
 (0.0810) (0.175) (0.262) (0.0744) 
2004 -0.0718 -0.166 0.0474 -0.0648 
 (0.0654) (0.114) (0.174) (0.0905) 
2005 0.0239 0.0381 0.0588 -0.107 
 (0.0746) (0.132) (0.200) (0.151) 
2006 0.0765 -0.0512 -0.0535 0.140 
 (0.0757) (0.140) (0.199) (0.143) 
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2007 0.0838 -0.0710 -0.228 0.222 
 (0.0803) (0.135) (0.226) (0.178) 
2008 0.0201 -0.229 0.0875 0.110 
 (0.0832) (0.142) (0.259) (0.213) 
2009 0.190** -0.0955 -0.0367 -0.00025 
 (0.0893) (0.145) (0.329) (0.288) 
2010 0.0274 -0.212 0.194 -0.109 
 (0.191) (0.177) (0.358) (0.311) 
2011 0.0976 -0.459** -0.429 0.642 
 (0.198) (0.188) (0.493) (0.461) 
2012 0.205 -0.143 -1.202** 0.987* 
 (0.202) (0.191) (0.591) (0.561) 
 
    
Note: Robust standard errors are in brackets, ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. Only the 
coefficients for the ratification dummies and interactions with the group dummy are shown. Both Rat. denotes interactions between time 
dummies and a dummy variable that takes the value of one when both countries ratify the convention, zero otherwise. Imp. Rat. denotes 
interactions between time dummies and a dummy variable that takes the value of one when the importer country ratifies the convention, zero 
otherwise. Exp. Rat. denotes interactions between time dummies and a dummy variable that takes the value of one when the exporter country 
ratifies the convention, zero otherwise Both Rat. NS stands for North South meaning imports into non-OECD countries from OECD countries. i 
denotes importer, j denotes exporter and k denotes sector. 
 
Additionally, Table 7 shows estimations for specific groups of countries. We observe that in the case of the RC, there 
are negative and significant effects for African and American developing countries, but no effect for Asian 
developing countries. Regarding the SC, there is no significant effect observed with respect to individual groups of 
developing countries, rather the effect is for the group as a whole. One explanation could be that characteristics of 
developing countries other than their geographical location may affect the average results. 
As a final robustness test, we estimate the gravity model using the Helpman et al. (2008) method, which also 
considers the existence of zero trade flows. Methodologically, this is done by first estimating a Probit model for each 
year to infer whether the ratification of the agreements influences the probability of deciding whether or not to 
import a given product (HCs and POPs for the RC and SC, respectively) and then, in a second step, incorporating 
some elements of the first estimation (the inverse Mills ratio and the yearly predictions of the Probit) into the gravity 
model as specified in equation (5). The results indicate that the effect of ratifying the RC is slightly higher for 
imports into non-OECD countries from OECD countries when the extensive margin of imports is considered 
(coefficient equals 0.09), whereas the effect of the SC is only significant in the first step, but not statistically 
significant in the second, although the coefficient still maintains the direction of the change.20 More research is 
needed to be able to properly identify separate effects for the extensive and intensive margins of trade. 
 
                                                          
20
 Results available upon request from the authors. 
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Table 7:  Estimations by region of developing countries 
 
 
Developing countries by regions 
Rotterdam Convention (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep. Variable:ln Imports  MRT & ijk FE 
Regions Africa Asia America 
              
Both ratify RC -0.0392 -0.0189 -0.0392 -0.0389 -0.0392 0.0119 
(0.0280) (0.0300) (0.0280) (0.0302) (0.0280) (0.0313) 
Imp. ratifies RC x OECD to non-
OECD -0.192** 0.0796 0.00473 
(0.0915) (0.102) (0.0887) 
Exp. ratifies RC x  OECD to 
non-OECD -0.131** -0.0914 -0.0642 
(0.0637) (0.0613) (0.0588) 
Both ratify RC x  OECD to non-
OECD -0.000189 -0.0468 -0.194** 
(0.104) (0.113) (0.0984) 
Observations 111,849 111,849 111,849 111,849 111,849 111,849 
R-squared 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.088 
Number of ijk 14,370 14,370 14,37 14,37 14,370 14,370 
Stockholm Convention       (1)         (2)       (3)       (4)       (5)       (6) 
              
Both ratify SC -0.0456 -0.0428 -0.0456 -0.0332 -0.0456 -0.0475 
(0.0544) (0.0583) (0.0544) (0.0592) (0.0544) (0.0587) 
Imp. ratifies SC x OECD to non-
OECD -0.0292 -0.0679 0.234 
(0.135) (0.154) (0.180) 
Exp. ratifies SC x  OECD to non-
OECD -0.206 -0.128 0.0639 
(0.180) (0.104) (0.0991) 
Both ratify SC x  OECD to non-
OECD 0.161 4.50e-06 -0.193 
(0.220) (0.174) (0.197) 
Observations 42,011 42,011 42,011 42,011 42,011 42,011 
R-squared 0.087 0.087 0.087 0.088 0.087 0.088 
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Product dummies YES YES YES YES NO NO 
Country-and-time dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Dyadic-sector fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Ratification-country group 
interaction terms NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Number of ijk 6,113 6,113 6,113 6,113 6,113 6,113 
 
Note: Robust standard errors are in brackets, ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. The “importer 
(or exporter) ratifies” variable is encoded as a dummy variable equal to one if the importer (or exporter) ratifies (independently of what the 
exporter does) and zero otherwise. The “both ratify” dummy takes the value of one when the two trade partners are ratifying countries in a given 
year. i denotes importer, j denotes exporter and k denotes sector. 
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6.  Conclusions 
The main findings of this paper indicate that the Rotterdam Convention (RC) and the Stockholm Convention (SC) 
have been effective in reducing trade in HCs and POPs, respectively. This result is in contrast to the outcomes 
reported in the previous literature concerning other IEAs.  
More specifically, we find that when the exporter ratifies the RC and the flow is from OECD to non-OECD 
countries, a significant reduction of imports in HCs is observed after ratification. The magnitude of the effect is a 
cumulative decrease in imports of about 7 percent, which is not particularly high but may increase further the longer 
the convention remains in force. This effect is found after controlling for different sources of unobservable 
heterogeneity and is robust to changes in the specification. 
In the case of the SC, the results show significant reductions in trade in POPs for importers that ratify the convention 
and for POPs shipped from OECD to non-OECD countries, with trade decreasing after the non-OECD-importer has 
ratified the convention. We observe a reduction of around 16 percent, more than double the effect found for the RC, 
which was expected due to the different obligations imposed by the respective conventions. However, while the 
import-reducing effect of the RC is robust to the inclusion of zero trade flows and to changes in the aggregation level 
of import flows, that of the SC fades away when using aggregated imports.  Since there are products that are subject 
to both conventions and others that are affected by only one of them, ideally each product-case should be 
investigated separately. We leave for further research a detailed analysis with product-specific ratification effects for 
each convention, which also takes into account the registry of final decisions on individual PICs for specific trading 
countries. 
From a globalisation and trade perspective, the main policy implication of this research is that IEAs can be effective 
instruments to stop pollution diversion when environmental regulation increases in a country and not in the trading 
partner. Nevertheless, the more stringent an agreement is the bigger the effect. This goes in line with stringent 
environmental regulations in both countries and enforcement of institutions.  
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Appendix 
Table A1. Status of ratification of the conventions 
Country Rotterdam Convention 
Stockholm 
Convention Country 
Rotterdam 
Convention 
Stockholm 
Convention 
Algeria NR 2006 Madagascar 2004 2005 
Argentina 2004 2005 Malawi 2009 2009 
Australia 2004 2004 Malaysia 2002 NR 
Austria 2002 2002 Malta NR NR 
Bangladesh NR 2007 Mauritius 2005 2004 
Belgium 2002 2006 Mexico 2005 2003 
Bolivia 2003 2003 Morocco 2011 2004 
Brazil 2004 2004 Mozambique 2010 2005 
Bulgaria 2000 2004 Netherlands 2000 2002 
Canada 2002 2001 New Zealand 2003 2004 
Chile 2005 2005 Nicaragua 2008 2005 
China 2005 2004 Nigeria 2001 2004 
Colombia 2008 2008 Norway 2001 2002 
Costa Rica 2006 2007 Pakistan 2005 2008 
Croatia 2007 2007 Panama 2000 2003 
Czech Republic 2000 2002 Paraguay 2005 2004 
Denmark 2004 2003 Peru 2005 2005 
Dominican Republic 2006 2007 Philippines 2006 2004 
Ecuador 2004 2004 Poland 2005 2008 
Egypt NR 2003 Portugal 2005 2004 
El Salvador 1999 2008 Romania 2003 2004 
Estonia 2006 2013 Russian Federation 2011 2011 
Ethiopia 2003 2003 Senegal 2001 2003 
Finland 2004 2002 Singapore 2005 2005 
France 2004 2004 Slovakia 2007 2002 
Germany 2001 2002 Slovenia 1999 2004 
Greece 2003 2006 South Africa 2002 2002 
Guatemala 2010 2008 Spain 2004 2004 
Honduras 2011 2005 Sri Lanka 2006 2005 
Hungary 2000 2008 Sweden 2003 2002 
Iceland NR 2002 Switzerland 2002 2003 
India 2005 2006 Thailand 2002 2005 
Indonesia 2013 2009 Trinidad and Tobago 2009 2002 
Ireland 2005 2010 Tunisia NR 2004 
Israel 2011 NR Turkey NR 2009 
Italy 2002 NR Uganda 2008 2004 
Jamaica 2002 2007 Ukraine 2002 2007 
Japan 2004 2002 United Kingdom 2004 2005 
Jordan 2002 2004 United States of America NR NR 
Kenya 2005 2004 Uruguay 2003 2004 
Korea, Republic of 2003 2007 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 2005 2005 
Latvia 2003 2004 Viet Nam 2007 2002 
Lithuania 2004 2006 Zambia 2011 2006 
Macedonia, Republic of 2010 2004 Zimbabwe 2012 2012 
Note: NR= Not ratified.  Source: Rotterdam Convention Website and Stockholm Convention Website:  
http://www.pic.int/Countries/Statusofratifications/tabid/1072/language/en-US/Default.aspx. 
http://chm.pops.int/Countries/StatusofRatifications/PartiesandSignatoires/tabid/4500/Default.aspxs. 
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Table A2.  Harmonized System Codes Assigned to Annex III Chemicals. Rotterdam Convention. HS (rev. 
2012) 
Rotterdam Convention 
Annex III Chemicals  HS Code HS Code (*3) 
and Pesticides Pure Substance Mixtures, Preparations containing Substance 
2,4,5-T and its salts and esters 2918.91 3808.50 (*1) 
Alachlor See below (*4)   
Aldicarb See below (*4)   
Aldrin 2903.82 3808.50 (*1) 
Binapacryl 2916.16 3808.50 (*1) 
Captafol 2930.50 3808.50 (*1) 
Chlordane 2903.82 3808.50 (*1) 
Chlordimeform 2925.21 3808.50 (*1) 
Chlorobenzilate 2918.18 3808.50 (*1) 
DDT 2903.92 3808.50 (*1) 
Dieldrin 2910.40 3808.50 (*1) 
DNOC and its salts (such as  
2908.92 3808.50 (*1) ammonium salt, potassium salt  
and sodium salt)  
DNOC and its salts (such as  
2908.92 3808.50 (*1) 
 ammonium salt, potassium salt  
and sodium salt) 
Dinoseb and its salts 2908.91 3808.50 (*1) 
Dinoseb acetate 2915.36 3808.50 (*1) 
1,2-dibromoethane (EDB) 2903.31 
3808.50 (*1) 
3811.11, 3811.19 
Endolsulfan See below (*4)   
Ethylene dichloride 2903.15 3808.50 (*1) 
Ethylene oxide 2910.10 
3808.50 (*1) 
3824.81 
Fluoroacetamide 2924.12 3808.50 (*1) 
HCH (mixed isomers) 2903.81 3808.50 (*1) 
Heptachlor 2903.82 3808.50 (*1) 
Hexachlorobenzene 2903.92 3808.50 (*1) 
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Lindane 2903.81 3808.50 (*1) 
Mercury compounds including  
2852.10 3808.50 (*1) 
inorganic mercury compounds,  
alkyl mercury compounds and  
alkyloxyalkyl and aryl mercury  
compounds (CAS numbers) 
Monocrotophos  2924.12 3808.50 (*1) 
Parathion 2920.11 3808.50 (*1) 
Pentachlorophenol and its salts 
and esters 
2908.11 – Pentachlorophenol 
2908.19 – salts of  
Pentachlorophenol 
3808.50 (*1) 
Toxaphene  – 3808.50 (*1) 
Dustable powder formulations  
 – 3808.50 (*1) 
containing a combination of :  
benomyl at or above 7 per cent,  
carbofuran at above 10 per cent,  
thiram at or above 15 per cent 
Methamidophos (Soluble liquid  
2930.50 3808.50 (*1) 
formulations of the substance  
that exceed 600 g active  
ingredient/l) 
Phosphamidon (Soluble liquid  
2924.12 3808.50 (*1) 
formulations of the substance 
 that exceed 1000 g active  
ingredient/l) 
mixture, (E)&(Z) isomers) 
(Z)-isomer 
(E)-isomer 
Methyl-parathion (emulsifiable  
2920.11 3808.50 (*1) 
concentrates (EC) with 19.5%,  
40%, 50%, 60% active ingredient  
and dusts containing 1.5%, 2%  
and 3% active ingredient) 
Asbestos 2524.10 - Crocidolite 2524.90 –   
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Other (*2) 6811.40 – Containing asbestos. 
  
6812.91 – Clothing, clothing accessories,  
footwear and headgear 
6812.92 – Paper, millboard and felt 
6812.93 – Compressed asbestos fibre 
 jointingm in sheets or rolls 
6812.99 - Other 
  
6813.20 – Containing asbestos. 
   Crocidolite  2524.10 
The same as Asbestos other than  
heading 68.12 (*2) 
6812.80 
   Actinolite  2524.90 
The same as Asbestos (*2) 
6812.91 – Clothing, clothing accessories,  
footwear and headgear 
  
   Anthophyllite  2524.90 6812.92 – Paper, millboard and felt 
  Amosite 2524.90 
6892.93 – Compressed asbestos fibre 
 jointing in sheets or rolls 
   Tremolite  2524.90 6892.99 - Other 
Polybrominated biphenyls (PBB) 
 – 
2710.91 
   (hexa-) 3824.82 
   (octa-)   
   (deca-)   
Polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB)  – 
2710.91 
3824.82 
  
Polychlorinated terphenyls (PCT)  – 
2710.91 
3824.82 
Tetraethyl lead  2931.10 
 e.g., 3811.11 – Anti-knock preparations based  
on lead compounds 
Tetramethyl lead  2931.10 e.g., 3811.11 – Anti-knock preparations based 
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 on lead compounds 
Tris (2,3-dibromopropyl)  
2919.10 3824.83 
phosphate 
Tributyl tin compounds 2931.20 3808.50 (*1) 
Notes: (*1) Subheading 3808.50 covers only goods of heading 38.08, containing one or more of the following substances : aldrin (ISO); 
binapacryl (ISO); camphechlor (ISO) (toxaphene); captafol (ISO); chlordane (ISO); chlordimeform (ISO); chlorobenzilate (ISO); DDT 
(ISO) (clofenotane (INN), 1,1,1-trichloro-2,2-bis(p-chlorophenyl)ethane); dieldrin (ISO, INN); 4,6-dinitro-o-cresol (DNOC (ISO)) or its 
salts; dinoseb (ISO), its salts or its esters; ethylene dibromide (ISO) (1,2-dibromoethane); ethylene dichloride (ISO) (1,2-dichloroethane); 
fluoroacetamide (ISO) (1,2-dibromoethane); ethylene dichloride (ISO) (1,2-dichloroethane); fluoroacetamide (ISO); heptachlor (ISO); 
hexachlorobenzene (ISO); 1,2,3,4,5,6-hexachlorocyclohexane (HSH (ISO)), including lindane (ISO), INN); mercury compounds; 
methamidophos (ISO); monocrotophos (ISO); oxirane (ethylene oxide); parathion (ISO); ) parathion-methyl (ISO) (methyl-parathion); 
pentachlorophenol (ISO), its salts or its esters; phosphamidon (ISO); 2,4,5-T (ISO) (2,4,5-trichlorophenoxyacetic acid), its salts or its 
esters; tributyltin compounds.  Subheading 3808.50 also covers dustable powder formulations containing a mixture of benomyl (ISO), 
carbofuran (ISO) and thiram (ISO); 
 (*2) Asbestos is a natural mineral substance produced by the decomposition of certain rocks. 
 (*3)  The list of HS codes in the column for “HS Code Mixtures, Preparations containing Substance” is not exhaustive.  
(*4) This substance has entered into Annex III in 2011. HS code for this substance is expected to be assigned by WCO in 2017 
Source: Rotterdam Convention Website. 
http://www.pic.int/TheConvention/Chemicals/AnnexIIIChemicals/tabid/1132/language/en-US/Default.aspx. 
 
 
Table A3. CAS (Chemical Abstracts Service) and HS (Harmonized System) codes. Stockholm Convention. HS 
(rev. 2012) 
Stockholm Convention 
Annex A  ELIMINATION 
Chemical   HS code Activity Specific exemptions 
Aldrin*  
 
Production   None 
CAS No: 309-00-2  290382 Use Local ectoparasiticide Insecticide  
Alpha hexachlorocyclohexane*  
 
Production   None 
CAS No: 319-84-6  290381 Use   None 
Beta hexachlorocyclohexane*  
 
Production   None 
CAS No: 319-85-7  290381 Use   None 
Chlordane* 
 
Production   As allowed for the Parties listed in the Register  
CAS No: 57-74-9  
290382 
Use 
Local ectoparasiticide   
 
Insecticide 
290382 Termiticide 
 
Termiticide in buildings and dams  
 
Termiticide in roads 
 
Additive in plywood adhesives  
Chlordecone*  
 
Production   None 
CAS No: 143-50-0  291470 Use   None 
Dieldrin*  
 
Production None  
CAS No: 60-57-1  291040 Use   In agricultural operations  
Endrin*  
 
Production None  
CAS No: 72-20-8  291090 Use   None 
Heptachlor* 
 
Production None  
CAS No: 76-44-8  
 
Use  
Termiticide 
290382 Termiticide in structures of houses  
 
Termiticide (subterranean) 
 
Wood treatment 
 
In use in underground cable boxes  
Hexabromobiphenyl*  
 
Production None  
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CAS No: 36355-01-8  290399 Use   None 
Hexabromodiphenyl ether*  
 
Production None  
and 
 
Use   
Use Articles in accordance with the 
heptabromodiphenyl ether*   provisions of Part IV of this Annex  
Hexachlorobenzene  
 
Production  As allowed for the Parties listed in the Register  
CAS No: 118-74-1  
 
Use  
Intermediate 
290392 Solvent in pesticide  
 
Closed system site limited  
 
intermediate2  
Lindane* 
 
Production None  
CAS No: 58-89-9  290381 Use  Human health pharmaceutical for control of head lice and 
scabies as second line treatment  
Mirex* 
 
Production  As allowed for the Parties listed in the Register  
CAS No: 2385-85-5  290389 Use  Termiticide 
Pentachlorobenzene* 
 
Production  None  
 CAS No: 608-93-5  290399 Use   None 
Polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB)*  
 Production  None  
 
  
 Use  Articles in use in accordance with the provisions  
 
of Part II of this Annex  
Tetrabromodiphenyl ether* and 
 
Production  None  
pentabromodiphenyl ether*   Use  Articles in accordance with the provisions of  
 
Part V of this Annex  
Toxaphene* 
 
Production  None  
CAS No: 8001-35-2  380850 Use   None 
Notes: (i) Except as otherwise specified in this Convention, quantities of a chemical occurring as unintentional trace contaminants in products 
and articles shall not be considered to be listed in this Annex; 
 (ii) This note shall not be considered as a production and use specific exemption for purposes of paragraph 2 of Article 3. Quantities of a 
chemical occurring as constituents of  articles manufactured or already in use before or on the date of entry into force of the relevant 
obligation with respect to that chemical, shall not be considered as listed in this Annex, provided that a Party has notified the Secretariat that a 
particular type of article remains in use within that Party. The Secretariat shall make such notifications publicly available; 
 (iii)  This note, which does not apply to a chemical that has an (*) following its name in the Chemical column in Part I of this Annex, shall not 
be considered as a production and use specific exemption for purposes of paragraph 2 of Article 3. Given that no significant quantities of the 
chemical are expected to reach humans and the environment during the production and use of a closed-system site- limited intermediate, a 
Party, upon notification to the Secretariat, may allow the production and use of quantities of a chemical listed in this Annex as a closed-system 
site-limited intermediate that is chemically transformed in the manufacture of other chemicals that, taking into consideration the criteria in 
paragraph 1 of Annex D, do not exhibit the characteristics of persistent organic pollutants. This notification shall include information on total 
production and use of such chemical or a reasonable estimate of such information and information regarding the nature of the closed-system 
site- limited process including the amount of any non-transformed and ; unintentional trace contamination of the persistent organic pollutant- 
starting material in the final product. This procedure applies except as otherwise specified in this Annex. The Secretariat shall make such 
notifications available to the Conference of the Parties and to the public. Such production or use shall not be considered a production or use 
specific exemption. Such production and use shall cease after a ten-year period, unless the Party concerned submits a new notification to the 
Secretariat, in which case the period will be extended for an additional ten years unless the Conference of the Parties, after a review of the 
production and use decides otherwise. The notification procedure can be repeated; 
(iv)  All the specific exemptions in this Annex may be exercised by Parties that have registered exemptions in respect of them in accordance 
with Article 4 with the exception of the use of polychlorinated biphenyls in articles in use in accordance with the provisions of Part II, which 
may be exercised by all Parties. 
 
Source: http://chm.pops.int/TheConvention/Overview/TextoftheConvention/tabid/2232/Default.aspx. 
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Table A4.  Full results Rotterdam Convention (six-digit codes disaggregation) 
Dep. Variable: ln Imports  Gravity controls& t, k FE 
Gravity controls k 
FE&MRT MRT & ijk FE 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
Ln(GDP) importer 0.450*** 0.449*** 
(0.0102) (0.0102) 
Ln(GDP) exporter 0.615*** 0.615*** 
(0.0114) (0.0115) 
OECD to non-OECD -1.104*** -1.115*** 3.674*** 3.682*** 
(0.0436) (0.0487) (0.506) (0.508) 
OECD to OECD -1.648*** -1.642*** 7.030*** 6.962*** 
(0.0560) (0.0561) (0.595) (0.597) 
Non-OECD  to OECD -1.272*** -1.265*** 2.755*** 2.728*** 
(0.0599) (0.0599) (0.318) (0.318) 
Ln(distance) -0.478*** -0.480*** -0.825*** -0.822*** 
(0.0214) (0.0214) (0.0262) (0.0261) 
Contiguity 0.537*** 0.536*** 0.472*** 0.475*** 
(0.0639) (0.0640) (0.0635) (0.0635) 
Common language 0.238*** 0.236*** 0.0803* 0.0804* 
(0.0403) (0.0403) (0.0468) (0.0468) 
Colony ties 0.149* 0.135 -0.0648 -0.0661 
(0.0835) (0.0832) (0.0943) (0.0942) 
RTA 0.290*** 0.290*** 0.171*** 0.171*** 0.134*** 0.135*** 
(0.0388) (0.0389) (0.0435) (0.0435) (0.0333) (0.0334) 
WTO 0.119*** 0.114*** 0.156*** 0.153*** 0.174*** 0.174*** 
(0.0334) (0.0333) (0.0455) (0.0455) (0.0429) (0.0430) 
Common currency 0.687*** 0.685*** 0.452*** 0.435*** 0.160** 0.138** 
(0.0742) (0.0744) (0.0813) (0.0817) (0.0633) (0.0632) 
Importer ratifies RC 0.106** 0.0109 
(0.0432) (0.0511) 
Exporter ratifies RC 0.0655* 0.148*** 
(0.0396) (0.0470) 
Both ratify RC -0.142*** -0.134** -0.0548 -0.0447 -0.0542** -0.0310 
(0.0474) (0.0599) (0.0363) (0.0424) (0.0218) (0.0268) 
Imp. ratifies RC x  OECD to non-
OECD 0.295*** 0.0426 -0.00195 
(0.0738) (0.0681) (0.0477) 
Exp. ratifies RC x  OECD to 
non-OECD -0.184*** -0.111** -0.0730** 
(0.0550) (0.0522) (0.0359) 
Both ratify RC x  OECD to 
non-OECD -0.0740 -0.0440 -0.0513 
(0.0895) (0.0825) (0.0584) 
Observations 209,951 209,951 209,951 209,951 209,951 209,951 
R-squared 0.255 0.255 0.349 0.349 0.067 0.067 
Note: Robust standard errors are in brackets, ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent 
level, respectively. The “importer (or exporter) ratifies” variable is encoded as a dummy variable equal to one if the 
importer (or exporter) ratifies (independently of what the exporter does) and zero otherwise. The “both ratify” 
dummy takes the value of one when the two trade partners are ratifier countries in a given year. 
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Table A5.  Full results Stockholm Convention  (six-digit codes disaggregation) 
 Dep. Variable:  
ln Imports   Gravity controls& t, k FE 
Gravity controls k 
FE&MRT MRT & ijk FE 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
Ln(GDP) importer 0.603*** 0.602*** 
(0.0181) (0.0181) 
Ln(GDP) exporter 0.812*** 0.812*** 
(0.0195) (0.0196) 
OECD to non-OECD -1.188*** -1.221*** 4.913*** 5.051*** 
(0.0784) (0.0838) (0.832) (0.837) 
OECD to OECD -1.427*** -1.428*** 9.344*** 9.469*** 
(0.0961) (0.0961) (0.989) (0.992) 
Non-OECD  to OECD -0.405*** -0.407*** 4.545*** 4.553*** 
(0.109) (0.109) (0.552) (0.551) 
Ln(distance) -0.362*** -0.363*** -0.647*** -0.651*** 
(0.0368) (0.0369) (0.0437) (0.0438) 
Contiguity 0.399*** 0.399*** 0.599*** 0.598*** 
(0.0933) (0.0933) (0.0918) (0.0918) 
Common language 0.166** 0.166** 0.0167 0.0155 
(0.0686) (0.0686) (0.0814) (0.0813) 
Colony ties 0.376*** 0.372*** -0.0762 -0.0644 
(0.141) (0.141) (0.173) (0.173) 
RTA 0.0237 0.0187 -0.0542 -0.0517 0.00556 0.00658 
(0.0703) (0.0705) (0.0799) (0.0799) (0.0567) (0.0567) 
WTO 0.0701 0.0688 0.359*** 0.361*** 0.457*** 0.458*** 
(0.0595) (0.0594) (0.0852) (0.0852) (0.0754) (0.0754) 
Common currency 0.795*** 0.799*** 0.163 0.167 0.226** 0.215** 
(0.0969) (0.0973) (0.114) (0.114) (0.0960) (0.0960) 
Importer ratifies SC -0.147* -0.163* 
(0.0801) (0.0931) 
Exporter ratifies SC 0.237*** 0.254*** 
(0.0765) (0.0916) 
Both ratify SC -0.0208 -0.0413 0.00223 -0.0436 0.0143 0.0209 
(0.0871) (0.109) (0.0650) (0.0732) (0.0381) (0.0439) 
Imp. ratifies SC x OECD to 
non-OECD 0.0613 -0.253** -0.157** 
(0.113) (0.103) (0.0798) 
Exp. ratifies SC x OECD to 
non-OECD -0.0509 0.0286 -0.0820 
(0.103) (0.0877) (0.0601) 
Both ratify SC x OECD to 
non-OECD 0.0721 0.267** 0.0887 
(0.149) (0.133) (0.0988) 
Observations 91,673 91,673 91,673 91,673 91,673 91,673 
R-squared 0.219 0.219 0.318 0.318 0.069 0.069 
Note: Robust standard errors are in brackets, ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent 
level, respectively. The “importer (or exporter) ratifies” variable is encoded as a dummy variable equal to one if the 
importer (or exporter) ratifies (independently of what the exporter does) and zero otherwise. The “both ratify” 
dummy takes the value of one when the two trade partners are ratifier countries in a given year. 
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Table A6:  Rotterdam Convention two digits codes aggregation 
 
 Dep. Variable:ln Imports   Gravity controls& t, k FE 
Gravity controls k 
FE&MRT MRT & ijk FE 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
Ln(GDP) importer 0.610*** 0.609*** 
(0.0189) (0.0189) 
Ln(GDP) exporter 0.921*** 0.921*** 
(0.0200) (0.0200) 
OECD to non-OECD -1.247*** -1.209*** 5.159*** 5.223*** 
(0.0811) (0.0880) (0.869) (0.874) 
OECD to OECD -1.935*** -1.932*** 10.48*** 10.38*** 
(0.108) (0.108) (1.015) (1.018) 
Non-OECD  to OECD -1.699*** -1.689*** 4.510*** 4.459*** 
(0.105) (0.106) (0.527) (0.526) 
Ln(distance) -0.732*** -0.734*** -1.234*** -1.230*** 
(0.0405) (0.0405) (0.0473) (0.0472) 
Contiguity 0.769*** 0.768*** 0.510*** 0.513*** 
(0.132) (0.132) (0.128) (0.128) 
Common language 0.476*** 0.474*** 0.179** 0.179** 
(0.0762) (0.0762) (0.0794) (0.0795) 
Colony ties 0.328** 0.311** 0.0220 0.0181 
(0.154) (0.153) (0.171) (0.171) 
RTA 0.314*** 0.319*** 0.184** 0.185** 0.0816 0.0825 
(0.0745) (0.0746) (0.0784) (0.0786) (0.0524) (0.0525) 
WTO 0.146** 0.140** 0.230*** 0.225*** 0.245*** 0.244*** 
(0.0613) (0.0612) (0.0737) (0.0738) (0.0675) (0.0676) 
Common currency 0.869*** 0.863*** 0.573*** 0.542*** 0.180 0.132 
(0.158) (0.158) (0.146) (0.146) (0.111) (0.111) 
Importer ratifies RC 0.199*** 0.126 
(0.0770) (0.0874) 
Exporter ratifies RC 0.233*** 0.384*** 
(0.0716) (0.0839) 
Both ratify RC -0.238*** -0.303*** -0.143** -0.129* -0.134*** -0.0778* 
(0.0844) (0.104) (0.0611) (0.0698) (0.0364) (0.0449) 
Imp. ratifies RC x   OECD 
to non-OECD 0.256* -0.00420 -0.0300 
(0.138) (0.118) (0.0759) 
Exp. ratifies RC x  OECD 
to non-OECD -0.346*** -0.216** -0.102* 
(0.0972) (0.0856) (0.0591) 
Both ratify RC x  OECD 
to non-OECD 0.0740 -0.0212 -0.117 
(0.166) (0.142) (0.0943) 
Observations 72,176 72,176 72,176 72,176 72,176 72,176 
R-squared 0.311 0.312 0.480 0.480 0.101 0.102 
Note: Robust standard errors are in brackets, ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent 
level, respectively. The “importer (or exporter) ratifies” variable is encoded as a dummy variable equal to one if the 
importer (or exporter) ratifies (independently of what the exporter does) and zero otherwise. The “both ratify” 
dummy takes the value of one when the two trade partners are ratifier countries in a given year. 
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Table A7.  Stockholm Convention fourth digits codes aggregation 
 Dep. Variable:  
ln Imports   Gravity controls& t, k FE Gravity controls k FE&MRT MRT & ijk FE 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ln(GDP) importer 0.591*** 0.590*** 
(0.0203) (0.0202) 
Ln(GDP) exporter 0.766*** 0.766*** 
(0.0225) (0.0226) 
OECD to non-OECD -1.099*** -1.115*** 5.295*** 5.470*** 
(0.0887) (0.0946) (0.776) (0.784) 
OECD to OECD -1.364*** -1.363*** 9.727*** 9.858*** 
(0.108) (0.108) (1.032) (1.038) 
Non-OECD  to OECD -0.486*** -0.488*** 4.521*** 4.523*** 
(0.122) (0.122) (0.683) (0.683) 
Ln(distance) -0.309*** -0.310*** -0.604*** -0.607*** 
(0.0412) (0.0412) (0.0507) (0.0507) 
Contiguity 0.374*** 0.374*** 0.548*** 0.548*** 
(0.111) (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) 
Common language 0.123 0.122 -0.000910 -0.00224 
(0.0801) (0.0801) (0.0967) (0.0966) 
Colony ties 0.421*** 0.416*** -0.0679 -0.0559 
(0.143) (0.143) (0.180) (0.180) 
RTA 0.0350 0.0309 -0.0401 -0.0370 -0.0160 -0.0147 
(0.0784) (0.0787) (0.0895) (0.0896) (0.0595) (0.0596) 
WTO 0.134** 0.131** 0.409*** 0.413*** 0.493*** 0.497*** 
(0.0670) (0.0668) (0.0876) (0.0876) (0.0787) (0.0787) 
Common currency 0.821*** 0.823*** 0.155 0.158 0.206** 0.192* 
(0.112) (0.112) (0.134) (0.134) (0.102) (0.102) 
Importer ratifies SC -0.138 -0.156 
(0.0903) (0.105) 
Exporter ratifies SC 0.265*** 0.302*** 
(0.0853) (0.102) 
Both ratify SC -0.0148 -0.0382 -0.00893 -0.0451 -0.00331 0.0223 
(0.0975) (0.122) (0.0713) (0.0809) (0.0398) (0.0458) 
Imp. ratifies SC x OECD 
to non-OECD 0.0731 -0.280** -0.195** 
(0.129) (0.115) (0.0828) 
Exp. ratifies SC x OECD 
to non-OECD -0.103 0.0142 -0.0412 
(0.113) (0.0963) (0.0624) 
Both ratify SC x OECD 
to non-OECD 0.0804 0.253* 0.0420 
(0.167) (0.150) (0.102) 
Observations 80,720 80,720 80,720 80,720 80,720 80,720 
R-squared 0.181 0.181 0.284 0.284 0.075 0.075 
 
Note: Robust standard errors are in brackets, ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent 
level, respectively. The “importer (or exporter) ratifies” variable is encoded as a dummy variable equal to one if the 
importer (or exporter) ratifies (independently of what the exporter does) and zero otherwise. The “both ratify” 
dummy takes the value of one when the two trade partners are ratifier countries in a given year. 
  
45 
 
Table A8:  Rotterdam Convention.  Aggregated imports 
 Dep. Variable:  
ln Imports   Gravity controls& t, k FE Gravity controls k FE&MRT MRT & ijk FE 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
Ln(GDP) importer 0.586*** 0.585*** 
(0.0204) (0.0204) 
Ln(GDP) exporter 0.980*** 0.980*** 
(0.0215) (0.0215) 
OECD to non-OECD -1.230*** -1.243*** 5.721*** 5.773*** 
(0.0879) (0.0967) (0.878) (0.884) 
OECD to OECD -2.047*** -2.045*** 11.04*** 10.93*** 
(0.117) (0.117) (1.015) (1.019) 
Non-OECD  to OECD -1.916*** -1.906*** 4.412*** 4.374*** 
(0.113) (0.114) (0.511) (0.512) 
Ln(distance) -0.832*** -0.835*** -1.366*** -1.362*** 
(0.0421) (0.0421) (0.0473) (0.0473) 
Contiguity 0.883*** 0.880*** 0.520*** 0.522*** 
(0.134) (0.134) (0.131) (0.131) 
Common language 0.616*** 0.613*** 0.216*** 0.217*** 
(0.0815) (0.0815) (0.0782) (0.0782) 
Colony ties 0.298* 0.276 0.106 0.0996 
(0.176) (0.175) (0.190) (0.191) 
RTA 0.413*** 0.417*** 0.300*** 0.301*** 0.102* 0.105* 
(0.0775) (0.0777) (0.0779) (0.0782) (0.0542) (0.0542) 
WTO 0.231*** 0.225*** 0.284*** 0.281*** 0.272*** 0.273*** 
(0.0662) (0.0662) (0.0824) (0.0825) (0.0768) (0.0769) 
Common currency 0.564*** 0.563*** 0.283** 0.243* 0.212* 0.142 
(0.167) (0.166) (0.133) (0.134) (0.110) (0.110) 
Importer ratifies RC 0.177** 0.0575 
(0.0820) (0.0930) 
Exporter ratifies RC 0.205*** 0.323*** 
(0.0777) (0.0896) 
Both ratify RC -0.133 -0.144 -0.137** -0.0869 -0.119*** -0.0602 
(0.0890) (0.109) (0.0572) (0.0653) (0.0362) (0.0451) 
Imp. ratifies RC x   OECD 
to non-OECD 0.412*** 0.0545 -0.102 
(0.148) (0.116) (0.0752) 
Exp. ratifies RC x  OECD 
to non-OECD -0.261** -0.218*** -0.171*** 
(0.105) (0.0823) (0.0601) 
Both ratify RC x  OECD to 
non-OECD -0.101 -0.150 -0.0646 
(0.176) (0.136) (0.0923) 
Observations 53,268 53,268 53,268 53,268 53,268 53,268 
R-squared 0.353 0.354 0.582 0.582 0.139 0.140 
Note: Robust standard errors are in brackets, ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent 
level, respectively. The “importer (or exporter) ratifies” variable is encoded as a dummy variable equal to one if the 
importer (or exporter) ratifies (independently of what the exporter does) and zero otherwise. The “both ratify” 
dummy takes the value of one when the two trade partners are ratifier countries in a given year. 
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Table A9.  Stockholm Convention. Aggregated imports 
   
Dep. Variable: ln Imports   Gravity controls& t, k FE 
Gravity controls k 
FE&MRT MRT & ijk FE 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
Ln(GDP) importer 0.801*** 0.801*** 
(0.0284) (0.0284) 
Ln(GDP) exporter 1.174*** 1.174*** 
(0.0300) (0.0300) 
OECD to non-OECD -0.995*** -1.003*** 8.622*** 8.943*** 
(0.133) (0.141) (1.255) (1.265) 
OECD to OECD -1.165*** -1.166*** 15.53*** 15.72*** 
(0.159) (0.159) (1.733) (1.743) 
Non-OECD  to OECD -1.062*** -1.063*** 6.458*** 6.451*** 
(0.183) (0.182) (1.194) (1.199) 
Ln(distance) -0.477*** -0.478*** -0.908*** -0.910*** 
(0.0562) (0.0561) (0.0611) (0.0611) 
Contiguity 0.597*** 0.597*** 0.696*** 0.699*** 
(0.155) (0.155) (0.141) (0.140) 
Common language 0.393*** 0.392*** 0.253** 0.252** 
(0.113) (0.113) (0.109) (0.109) 
Colony ties 0.788*** 0.785*** 0.0663 0.0817 
(0.213) (0.213) (0.271) (0.270) 
RTA 0.215** 0.213** 0.0648 0.0706 -0.0573 -0.0537 
(0.106) (0.106) (0.107) (0.107) (0.0830) (0.0832) 
WTO 0.0602 0.0590 0.393*** 0.398*** 0.370*** 0.377*** 
(0.0983) (0.0980) (0.130) (0.130) (0.117) (0.117) 
Common currency 0.602*** 0.603*** 0.0750 0.0712 0.162 0.125 
(0.181) (0.181) (0.161) (0.161) (0.161) (0.161) 
Importer ratifies SC -0.260** -0.268* 
(0.126) (0.144) 
Exporter ratifies SC 0.0893 0.126 
(0.117) (0.140) 
Both ratify SC 0.171 0.141 0.0108 -0.00547 -0.0294 0.0740 
(0.136) (0.168) (0.0852) (0.0961) (0.0573) (0.0661) 
Imp. ratifies SC x OECD 
to non-OECD 0.0404 -0.407*** -0.172 
(0.184) (0.150) (0.108) 
Exp. ratifies SC x OECD 
to non-OECD -0.0935 -0.0708 -0.0912 
(0.159) (0.119) (0.0844) 
Both ratify SC x OECD to 
non-OECD 0.0859 0.275 -0.159 
(0.234) (0.188) (0.134) 
Observations 32,562 32,562 32,562 32,562 32,562 32,562 
R-squared 0.349 0.349 0.537 0.537 0.111 0.112 
Note: Robust standard errors are in brackets, ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent 
level, respectively. The “importer (or exporter) ratifies” variable is encoded as a dummy variable equal to one if the 
importer (or exporter) ratifies (independently of what the exporter does) and zero otherwise. The “both ratify” 
dummy takes the value of one when the two trade partners are ratifier countries in a given year. 
 
